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Abstract
We provide evidence that unemployment insurance affects equilibrium conditions
in the labor market, which creates significant “market externalities. We provide a
framework for identification of such equilibrium effects and implement it using the
Regional Extension Benefit Program in Austria which extended the duration of UI
benefits for a large group of eligible workers in selected regions of Austria. We
show that non-eligible workers in REBP regions have higher job finding rates, lower
unemployment durations, and a lower risk of long-term unemployment. We discuss
the implications of our results for optimal UI policy.
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The probability that an unemployed individual finds a job depends on her job search
strategy and on labor market conditions determining how easy (or difficult) it is to be
matched to a potential employer.1 Changes in unemployment insurance (UI) policies
affect the search strategy of unemployed workers which in turn affects their job search
outcomes. This is the micro effect of UI. Changes in UI policies also affect equilibrium
labor market conditions which in turn will affect the job finding probability for any given
search strategy. We call this second effect market externalities of UI.
The micro effect can be identified by comparing two individuals with different levels of
UI generosity in the same labor market. A large number of well-identified estimates of the
micro effect have shown that more generous UI benefits tend to increase unemployment
duration.2 In contrast, evidence on market externalities is scarce. The aim of this paper
is to bridge this gap.
Market externalities of UI are important for at least two reasons. First, the overall
effect of variations in UI on search outcomes, the macro effect, consists of both the micro
effect and market externalities. Studies comparing individuals subject to differential UI
benefit generosity within the same labor market identify the micro effect. These studies
cannot shed light on the true effect of UI if externalities are important. Second, market
externalities have first order welfare effects, as shown in Landais, Michaillat and Saez
[2010]. This implies that the sign and magnitude of market externalities is critical to
determine the optimal level of UI.
There is no theoretical consensus on the sign and magnitude of market externalities
of UI. And it is empirically challenging to estimate market externalities because general
equilibrium effects are typically hard to identify. Recent papers have tried to directly
estimate equilibrium effects of active labor market policies such as randomized programs
of counselling for job seekers without reaching a clear consensus (Blundell et al. [2004],
Ferracci, Jolivet and van den Berg [2010], Gautier et al. [2012]).3 More recently, Cre´pon
et al. [2013] analyze a job search assistance program for young educated unemployed in
France with two levels of randomization: the share of treated was randomly assigned across
labor markets, and within each labor market individual treatment was also randomized.
1Setting a job search strategy involves decisions such as: how hard to search, what jobs to search for,
how to set one’s reservation wage, etc. Labor market conditions depend on the number of job searchers
(and the intensity with which they search), on the number of available jobs, and on the extent to which
labor market frictions inhibit immediate matching of job searchers to open vacancies.
2See for instance Krueger and Meyer [2002] for a survey of early studies. More recent studies include
Landais [2013] for the US, Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012b] for Germany or Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller [2004a,b] for Austria.
3Blundell et al. [2004] study the effect of a counselling program for young unemployed in the UK and
find little evidence of displacement effects. Ferracci, Jolivet and van den Berg [2010] study a program
for young employed workers in France and find that the direct effect of the program is smaller in labor
markets where a larger fraction of the labor force is treated. Gautier et al. [2012] analyze a randomized
job search assistance program organized in 2005 in two Danish counties. Comparing control individuals
in experimental counties to job seekers in some similar non-participating counties, their results suggest
the presence of substantial negative spillovers.
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They find evidence of significant displacement effects for unemployed men who were not
in the program. But take-up of the training program was low (35%) and many job seekers
were already employed at the time of the experiment, substantially limiting the statistical
power to detect displacement effects.
Contrary to UI, active labor market programs do not directly affect outside options
of workers in the wage bargaining process, and miss a potentially important element
of equilibrium adjustments through wages. Active labor market programs are therefore
only partially informative about the market externalities of UI. We are aware of only one
paper that studies market externalities of UI. Levine [1993] finds that increases in the
replacement rate of UI decreases unemployment duration among the unemployed who are
ineligible for UI. Hagedorn et al. [2013] estimate a macro elasticity of unemployment with
respect to UI variations for the U.S. by comparing counties on the border of states with
different potential benefit duration. Our estimates are compatible with the macro elas-
ticity they find. Our results complement their findings in suggesting that the micro effect
is larger than the macro effect, due to the existence of significant market externalities.
In this paper we shed new light on market externalities of UI. First, we show how
market externalities can be identified in a quasi-experimental setting by looking at the
effect of a UI benefit variation in a given labor market on job search outcomes of workers
who are not eligible to the UI benefit variation but who search in the same labor market.
We define the relevant labor market as the place where workers are competing for the same
vacancies, and propose a new method to determine the scope of a labor market using
vacancy data. Second, we implement this strategy and offer evidence of the existence
of market externalities of UI benefit extensions using the Regional Extension Benefit
Program (REBP) in Austria. This program extended unemployment benefits drastically
for a large subset of workers in selected regions of Austria from June 1988 until August
1993. We focus on unemployed workers in REBP regions who are similar to the eligible
unemployed, compete for the same vacancies, but are not eligible for REBP because they
fail to meet the eligibility requirements of the REBP program. Using a difference-in-
difference identification strategy, we compare these non-eligible unemployed to similar
non-eligible unemployed in non-REBP regions to identify the effect of REBP on duration
of job search of non-eligible unemployed in treated markets.
The REBP is a compelling empirical setting to study market externalities of UI. First,
treated workers received an extra three years of covered unemployment with an unchanged
benefit level. This large UI extension generated a strong increase in unemployment dura-
tion of treated workers thereby manipulating equilibrium labor market conditions [Lalive,
2008]. Second, REBP was enacted only in a subset of regions (28 of about 100 regions)
and, within treated regions, 90% of workers above 50 years old were eligible to the pro-
gram. This allows us to study how ineligible job seekers in REBP regions compare to
similar workers in non-REBP regions. While the choice of treated regions and workers
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is partially endogenous, we use specific features of the REBP program to build a credi-
ble identification strategy. Finally, administrative data on the universe of unemployment
spells is available in Austria since the 1980s. By matching data from the unemployment
register with social security data on the universe of employment spells in Austria since
1949, we can determine eligibility status for the REBP program along all eligibility dimen-
sions. Our data also enable us to look at many different outcomes, from unemployment
and non-employment durations, to reemployment characteristics and wages. As the data
cover sufficiently long periods before and after the REBP program, we are able to study
whether externalities appear during the program and whether they disappear after the
program is repealed.
Our results demonstrate the presence of sizable market externalities of UI. REBP
induced a 2 to 4 weeks decrease in the average unemployment duration of all non-eligible
workers aged 46 to 54 compared to similar workers from non REBP regions. For non-
eligible workers aged 50 to 54, who are competing for similar vacancies as treated workers,
unemployment duration decreases by 6 to 8 weeks. These effects are the largest when the
program intensity reaches its highest level, then decrease and disappear as the program
is scaled down and finally interrupted. In our robustness analysis, we address the two
main potential confounders for our results. First, we provide evidence that our results are
unlikely to be driven by region-specific shocks contemporaneous with the REBP program.
Second, we show that our results are unlikely to be confounded by selection, i.e. a change
in unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers contemporaneous with the REBP
program. We also show evidence that the magnitude of the externalities on non-eligible
workers increases with the intensity of the REBP treatment across local labor markets.
We finally identify the presence of geographical spillovers of the REBP program on non-
REBP regions that have labor markets that are highly integrated to REBP regions.
Our empirical findings have important policy implications. First, the presence of sig-
nificant market externalities implies that the micro and the macro effect of UI extensions
will differ. Our estimates imply a significant wedge between the micro (em) and the macro
(eM) effect of UI extensions on the job finding rate of workers in labor markets that were
treated by REBP: W = 1 − eM/em ≈ .21. In the REBP setting, a segment only of the
labor force was treated, and substitution opportunities to treated workers were potentially
available in non-treated labor markets. We show that our estimated wedge is therefore
a lower bound on the magnitude of the wedge when the whole labor force is treated by
a change in UI benefits. Second, our results bear important implications for the design
of optimal UI policies. Our results imply that more generous UI benefits increase labor
market tightness and the job finding rate per unit of search effort. As a consequence,
the optimal level of UI will be larger than suggested by the partial equilibrium Baily-
Chetty formula (Chetty [2006]), as explained in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010]. This
means that temporary extensions enacted in reaction to business cycles downturns are
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less socially costly than what a partial equilibrium representation would suggest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents our theoretical
framework, explains the concept of market externalities and how they can be identi-
fied. Section II presents the institutional background of the REBP program. Section
III presents the data and our empirical strategy. It also shows how we can use vacancy
data to identify groups of non-treated workers competing with treated workers for jobs
in the same labor market. Section IV presents the results as well as our robustness and
heterogeneity analysis. Section V draws welfare and policy implications.
I Market externalities of UI and their identification
The probability that an individual finds a job depends on how hard that individual
searches for a job and/or on how selective she is in her acceptance decisions. It also
depends on the labor market conditions that determine how easy it is to locate jobs or to
be matched to a potential employer. These two forces are usually represented in equilib-
rium search and matching models by the stylized decomposition: hi = ei · f(θ). h is the
hazard rate out of unemployment. ei captures the search effort / selectiveness component.
θ is the ratio of job vacancies to total search effort, and represents the tightness of the
labor market. f(θ) therefore captures the effect of labor market conditions on the job
finding probability per unit of effort.4 If there are no job vacancies created by employers,
then f(θ) = 0 and no amount of search effort by an unemployed worker would yield a
positive probability of obtaining a job.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies affect the search intensity and selectiveness
of unemployed workers. We call this effect the micro effect of UI. It can be identified by
comparing two individuals with different levels of UI generosity in the same labor market.
However, changes in UI generosity also affect labor market conditions and the job finding
rate per unit of search effort. We call this second effect market externalities. It stems
from equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness θ in response to a change in UI
generosity. The overall effect on the job finding rate of a change in UI, the macro effect
of UI, is therefore the sum of the micro effect and market externalities.
There are at least two reasons why we care about identifying the presence of market
externalities of UI. First, when the generosity of UI varies, for instance due to UI benefit
extensions such as the recent EUC program in the US, the total effect on unemployment
will be the sum of the micro effect and of market externalities. Studies comparing in-
dividuals with different UI benefits within the same labor market will typically identify
only the micro effect, and cannot shed light on the true effect of such UI extensions.
Second, as shown in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010], market externalities have first
4Note that f, f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0 characterizes the matching process in a labor market with frictions.
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order welfare effects whenever the Hosios condition is not met. The sign and magnitude
of market externalities is therefore critical to determine the optimal level of UI.
As explained in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010], using the framework developed by
Michaillat [2012], the sign and magnitude of market externalities depends on two forces:
the rat race effect and the wage effect. Appendix A gives a detailed theoretical presenta-
tion of the framework, derives the formula for market externalities and the decomposition
into the rat race effect and the wage effect.
The rat race effect arises when labor demand is not perfectly elastic and does not fully
adjust to variations in search effort of unemployed workers, which will be the case when
technology exhibits diminishing returns to labor.5 Intuitively, in the extreme case when
there is a fixed number of jobs, an increase in an individual’s search effort will increase her
probability of finding a job. However, this must come at the expense of the probability
of all other unemployed to find a job as the total number of jobs remains unchanged.
Hence an increase in UI generosity, by decreasing aggregate search effort, increases the
probability of finding a job per unit of search effort f(θ). The rat race effect creates a
positive market externality.
The wage effect arises when wages are determined through a bargaining process. An
increase in UI generosity improves workers’ outside option and tend to increase wages.
This decreases the return from opening vacancies for firms, leading to a decrease in labor
demand. Thus the wage effect creates a negative market externality.
The overall effect of a change in UI benefits on equilibrium labor market tightness will
therefore depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects. When wages do not react
to a particular policy, the rat race effect will be the only driver of labor market tightness
adjustments to the policy. Studies estimating spillover effects of active labor market or
training programs such as Cre´pon et al. [2013] therefore tend to capture a pure rat race
effect as these training programs are unlikely to affect bargained wages.
To identify market externalities, our strategy compares two groups of workers who are
searching for jobs in the same labor market. The first group is “treated” and experiences
an exogenous change of UI generosity, while the second group is not treated and does
not experience any change in UI benefits. The individual search effort of treated workers
will respond, changing their job finding probability. This change in search effort will also
affect equilibrium labor market tightness and therefore the job finding probability per
unit of search effort, creating labor market externalities. The change in the job finding
probability of non-treated workers will capture these market externalities.
In appendix A.2, we show under which conditions a change in the job finding probabil-
ity of non-treated workers can identify labor market externalities. The key identification
5Diminishing returns is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the presence of a downward
sloping labor demand. Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010] show for instance that an “aggregate demand
model” with a quantity equation for money and nominal wage rigidities will feature a downward sloping
labor demand even with linear technology.
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requirement is that treated and non-treated workers are in the same labor market, where a
labor market is defined as the market place where workers compete for the same vacancies.
From a search-theoretic standpoint, this definition is the most natural: it follows from
the law of one price, which defines one equilibrium labor market tightness for each labor
market. In practice this means that each labor market is characterized by a vacancy type,
and matching between the workers competing for these vacancies and employers posting
these vacancies exhibits randomness. In other words, when treated and non-treated work-
ers compete for these vacancies, a firm opening one such vacancy cannot know whether
it will be matched to a treated or to a non-treated worker. When this is the case, we
show in appendix A.2 that variations in the job finding probability of non-treated workers
in response to a change of UI for treated workers will identify market externalities of UI
and that, as the size of the treated group compared to the non-treated group increases,
market externalities on non-treated workers converge to identifying the equilibrium ef-
fects of treating the whole market. Importantly, market externalities identified through
the change in the job finding probability of non-treated workers will capture the wage
effect even if wages are bargained at the individual level. The intuition is that within a
labor market, because of random matching, the expected profit of opening vacancies is
the weighted average of the profits of opening vacancies for each group of workers. There-
fore the increase in bargained wages of treated workers will reduce the expected profit of
opening vacancies and will then affect overall vacancy posting in the market.
In appendix A.3, we also discuss the case when treated and non-treated workers do
not compete for the same vacancies, for instance because firms can discriminate between
treated and non-treated workers by offering them different types of vacancies. In that case,
non-treated workers will not be in the same labor market as treated workers and changes in
the job finding probability of non-treated workers will no longer directly identify variations
in labor market tightness for the treated labor market. Yet, UI variations for treated
workers may nevertheless still create externalities for non-treated workers. As shown
in appendix A.3, such externalities will arise across labor markets due to substitution
effects and are different in nature and magnitude from market externalities within a labor
market. The existence of externalities across labor markets due to substitution effects
bears implications for the interpretation of our results that we discuss in section V.
Identification of market externalities of UI extensions within a labor market requires
the ability to find two groups of workers with different UI levels within the same labor
market, i.e. competing for similar vacancies. Using vacancy data, we propose below a
simple method to determine whether two groups of workers are competing for similar job
vacancies by looking at how characteristics of job vacancies predict the group affiliation
of the individual filling the vacancy.
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II Austrian Unemployment Insurance and the REBP
Unemployment Insurance and Wage Setting Systems The Austrian UI system
is more restrictive than many other continental European systems and closer to the U.S.
system in terms of generosity. Workers who become unemployed can draw regular un-
employment benefits (UB), the amount of which depends on previous earnings. In 1990,
the replacement ratio (UB relative to gross monthly earnings) was 40.4 % for the median
income earner; 48.2 % for a worker earning half the median; and 29.6 % for a worker
earning twice the median. UB payments are not taxed, not means-tested, and there is no
experience rating.
The maximum number of weeks that one can receive UB (potential duration) depends
on work history (the number of weeks worked prior to becoming unemployed) and age.
For the age group 50 and older, UB-duration is 52 weeks; and for the age group 40-49, UB-
duration is 39 weeks. Voluntary quitters and workers laid off for misconduct can receive
UB but are subject to a waiting period of 4 weeks. UB recipients need to search actively
for a new job within the scope of the claimant’s qualifications. After UB payments have
been exhausted, job seekers can apply for post-UB transfers (“Notstandshilfe”). These
transfers are means-tested and depend on income and wealth of other family members
and close relatives. They are granted for successive 39-week periods after which eligibility
requirements are recurrently checked and can last for an indefinite time period. Post-UB
transfers can be at most 92 % of UB. In 1990, the median post-UB transfer payment
was about 70 % of the median UB. The majority of the unemployed (59 %) received UB
whereas 26 % received post-UB transfers.
Another relevant feature of the Austrian labor market is its system of wage formation.
Almost all workers are covered by collective agreements which take place at the sectoral
(or the occupational) level. Collective agreements impose a lower bound on workers’
wages. While the Austrian wage setting process is more centralized than in the US and
many European countries (except for Scandinavia), wages are less rigid than one might
prima facie think. First, while Austrian wage setting institutions impose a lot of downward
rigidity on wages in ongoing employment relationships, wage adjustments take place when
workers change jobs or start a new job after an unemployment spell. Second, existing
evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of workers are paid above the collectively
agreed minimum wage.6 To the extent that older workers are more experienced and
achieve higher wages than the collectively agreed wages, the wage floors of collective
agreements are unlikely to contaminate our analysis.
6Leoni and Pollan [2011] study “overpayments” (the ratio of effective wages over collectively bargained
wages). They find that, in the years when the REBP was in place, effective wages of blue collar workers
were, on average, between 20 to 25 percent above the collectively bargained minimum wages. Hence a
large fraction of workers is paid above the wage floor.
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Restructuring of the Austrian steel industry and the REBP After World War
II, Austria nationalized large parts of its heavy industries (iron, steel, etc). Firms in the
steel sector were part of a large holding company owned by the state, the Oesterreichische
Industrie AG, OeIAG. In 1986, after the steel industry was hit by an oil speculation
scandal and failure of a US steel-plant project, a new management was appointed and a
strict restructuring plan was implemented resulting in plant closures and downsizing.
To mitigate the labor market consequences of the restructuring plan, the Austrian
government enacted the Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) that extended UB-
entitlement to 209 weeks. To be eligible to 209 weeks of UB, the worker had to satisfy
each of the following criteria at the beginning of his or her unemployment spell: (i) age
50 or older; (ii) a continuous work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25
years prior to the current unemployment spell); (iii) location of residence in one of 28
selected labor market districts for at least 6 months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of
a new unemployment spell after June 1988 or spell in progress in June 1988. Note that
the REBP did not impose any industry requirement. All unemployed who met criteria
(i) to (iv) were eligible, irrespective of whether they previously worked in the steel sector
or not.
The REBP was in effect until December 1991 before a reform was implemented in
January 1992. This reform enacted two changes for new spells. First, the benefit exten-
sion was abolished in 6 of the originally 28 regions. We exclude from our analysis the
set of treated regions that were excluded after the 1991-reform. Second, the 1991-reform
tightened eligibility criteria for extended benefits: new beneficiaries had to be not only res-
idents, but also previously employed in a treated region. The program stopped accepting
new entrants in August 1, 1993. Job seekers who established eligibility to REBP before
August 1993 continued to be covered. We therefore set the end of the REBP program in
August 6, 1997 (209 weeks after August 1, 1993).
Apart from the REBP, the second measure to alleviate the problems associated with
mass redundancies in the steel sector was the so-called ’steel foundation’. Firms in the
steel sector could decide whether to join in order to provide their displaced workers with
re-training activities that were organized by the foundation. Member firms were obliged
to finance the foundation. Displaced individuals who decided to join this out-placement
center were entitled to regular unemployment benefits for a period of up to 3 years (later
4 years) regardless of age and experience. In 1988, the foundation consisted of 22 firms.
We exclude all workers employed or reemployed in the steel sector to make sure that the
workers in our sample did not have access to re-training activities provided by the steel
foundation. Notice further that no other labor market policies were put in place during
the REBP period that may confound the effect of the program. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller
[2004b] provide an extensive discussion of the context and institutional background of the
REBP and discuss the validity of the REBP as a research design.
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As the REBP was targeted to older workers it could also be used as a pathway to
early retirement, the main pathway being retirement via the disability insurance system.
The existence of these early retirement programs creates potential complementarities with
the REBP program that are susceptible to affect search effort and labor supply in non-
trivial ways (Inderbitzin, Staubli and Zweimu¨ller [2013]). In order to minimize these
complementarity effects and concentrate on the effects of the REBP program alone, we
focus primarily our analysis on male workers aged 50-54 as they cannot use unemployment
benefits as a direct pathway to early retirement.
III Data and identification strategy
Data Our data set covers the universe of UI spells in Austria from 1980 to 2009. In
our baseline estimation sample, and for reasons that we explain below, we focus on all
unemployed men aged 46 to 54 at the start of a spell. For each spell, we observe the dates
of entry and exit into paid unemployment, as well as information on age at the start of
the spell, region of residence at the beginning of the spell, education, marital status, etc.
This information is merged at the individual level with the universe of social security
data in Austria (Austrian Social Security Database, ASSD), which contains information
on each employment spell as well as information for each spell in a benefit program and
information on pensions and retirement. We use complementary information on insurance
spells back until 1949 to compute work history in the past 25 years for each individual to
precisely determine a worker’s REBP eligibility status.7 We also use social security data
to compute wages before and after each unemployment spell, as well as the total duration
of non-employment after the end of an employment spell. Finally, the social security data
gives us useful information about previous and subsequent employers (such as industry,
location, etc.) for each unemployment spell.
Because of early retirement programs in Austria during our period of analysis, women
above 50 and men above 55 can go directly from REBP or from regular unemployment
benefits to early retirement programs. For these workers, it is therefore unclear whether
the effect of REBP can be interpreted as a reduction in search effort or as an extensive
margin decision to exit the labor market. Search responses to UI along the intensive mar-
gin and exits from the labor markets have potentially different implications for equilibrium
analysis. Because our focus is on search externalities arising from responses to UI along
7For more information about the ASSD, see Zweimu¨ller et al. [2009]. The ASSD covers employment
spells from 1972 onwards. To measure worker’s experience during the last 25 years (necessary to de-
termine REBP-eligibility), we used complementary data from the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs
on employment spells back to 1949. (The UI administration used a similar source of information on
individual experience to determine REBP-eligibility.) As we do not observe final eligibility to REBP, our
approach is an intent-to-treat approach. There are a few observations with an experience level below
the REBP eligibility threshold who still received more than 52 weeks of paid UI. We get rid of these few
obviously misclassified observations in our estimation sample.
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the intensive margin, we mainly focus on unemployed men aged below 55 because they
cannot go directly from unemployment to early retirement. In our robustness analysis,
we show that our results are robust to these sample restrictions, and that externalities
can be detected on women, and on all men aged up to 59.
To determine which workers are competing for the same vacancies as REBP eligible
workers, we use detailed micro data on job vacancies posted in public employment agencies
available for the period 1994-1998.8 This data has two important features. First, the
data records detailed information about the characteristics of the vacancy.9 Second, the
vacancy data contains the personal identifier of the person who was hired for the position.
We use the identifier to see whether the successful job seeker was eligible for REBP or
not.
Identification in an experimental setting We first discuss identification in an ex-
perimental framework and discuss below how we implement it in the actual REBP setting.
There are two labor markets, M = 0, 1. Labor market M = 1 is randomly selected to re-
ceive some exogenous treatment, i.e. an increase in the potential duration of UI benefits.
Labor market M = 0 does not receive treatment and acts as a control. In labor market
M = 1, a random subset of workers is treated (T = 1) and receives a larger potential du-
ration of UI benefits while the rest of the workers do not receive treatment (T = 0). There
are three potential outcomes yTiM (where i indexes individuals): y
1
i1, when being treated
in a treated labor market, y0i1, when being untreated in a treated labor market, and y
0
i0
when being in a non-treated labor market. We are interested in the average externality
of the treatment on outcome yi, AE = E(y
0
i1 − y0i0).
Following the treatment evaluation literature, we can relate observed outcomes to the
average externality on the non-treated in treated labor markets, AENTT :
E(y0i1|T = 0,M = 1)− E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 0) =
AENTT︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(y0i1 − y0i0|T = 0,M = 1)
+E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 1)− E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection
(1)
Under double randomization (of treated labor markets and of treated individuals
within labor markets), the selection term in equation 1 is zero and AENTT can be identified
8We also have some crude vacancy data available for the period 1990-1994 that we use to compute
initial labor market tightness in appendix table 9. Unfortunately, we were not able to find or construct
consistent data throughout the period enabling us to analyze vacancy responses to the REBP.
9This includes the firm identifier of the firm posting the vacancy, the date (in month) at which the
vacancy is opened and the date at which it is closed, the reason for closing the vacancy, the identifier of
the public employment service where the vacancy is posted, the industry and job classifications of the job,
details on the duration and type of the contract, the age requirement if any, the education requirement
if any, the gender requirement if any, and the posted wage or range of wage if any.
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by comparing observed outcomes for the non-treated in labor market M = 1 to observed
outcomes for workers in labor market M = 0.
In our case, REBP treatment was not allocated at random, neither across nor within
labor markets. Our empirical strategy identifies AENTT adopting a difference-in-difference
design. This design is valid if unobserved differences between non-treated workers in
markets M = 0 and M = 1 remain fixed over time. We discuss below whether this
assumption is plausible and probe it in the context of robustness analyses.
In our context, treated workers (T = 1) are workers who are eligible for REBP, based
on the three eligibility criteria: age, experience and geography. To implement our diff-
in-diff strategy, (i) we need to properly define treated labor markets M = 1 and (ii), we
also need to properly define control labor markets M = 0.
Defining treated labor markets Our analysis focuses on non-eligible workers within
REBP counties, i.e. on workers who both live and had previous employment in REBP
counties. However, to properly define treated labor markets, we want to focus on non-
eligible workers within REBP counties who actually compete for the same job vacancies as
treated workers. If treated and non-treated workers are competing for similar vacancies,
the effect of the REBP on non-treated workers can identify equilibrium variations in labor
market tightness in the labor market. If treated and non-treated workers are competing
for different vacancies, there are in practice two search markets for labor, and the effect
of the program on non-treated workers identify market externalities due to substitution
effects.
To determine which groups of workers within REBP counties are competing for the
same vacancies as REBP eligible workers, we propose a method based on micro data on
job vacancies. The vacancy data contain, for each individual vacancy, detailed information
about the characteristics of the vacancy and the personal identifier of the person who filled
the vacancy. Our strategy uses all the information on each vacancy, and estimates how
well the characteristics of each vacancy predict the REBP eligibility status of the worker
who fills the vacancy. (Data and empirical strategy are discussed in detail in appendix
B.)
To implement this strategy, we regress the probability that the worker filling a given
vacancy is eligible to REBP on a vector of all the characteristics of the vacancy and run
the model separately for various categories of non-eligible workers against eligible workers.
For each of the categories of non-eligible workers, we then analyze the predictive power
of the model using various goodness-of-fit measures.10
10This model aims at testing the ability of firms to direct their search towards different types of
workers, who have different search effort due to REBP, by opening different types of vacancies. We
therefore estimate it in REBP regions when the REBP was in place. In places or times where REBP is
not in place, workers eligible to REBP (would the REBP be in place) and non-eligible workers have the
same level of UI benefits, their search effort is likely to be very similar, and firms have therefore much
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In figure 1 panel A, we plot the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit tests for the logit
model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness-of-fit test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 goodness-of-fit
test, for different categories of non-eligible workers. A low p-value for the test indicates a
poor fit of the data. Both tests suggest that the model fits the data very well for comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 35 to 40, but tend to perform more and more
poorly as we use non-eligible workers that are older. When comparing eligible workers to
non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54, the p-value is very close to zero, and the goodness-of-fit
of the model is extremely poor. In panel B of figure 1, we plot the fraction of observations
that are incorrectly predicted by the model (i.e. the predicted eligibility status to REBP is
different from the true eligibility status of the worker filling the vacancy) for all categories
of non-eligible workers. The fraction of misclassified observations is less than 7.5% for
the model comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 30 to 40, but increases
up to more than 25% for the model comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers
aged 50 to to 54. We also plot the fraction of type I errors, i.e. the fraction of true
non-eligible workers that are predicted as being eligible to REBP by the model.11 The
figure indicates that type I errors are very uncommon when comparing eligible workers to
non-eligible workers below 50, but they seem to be particularly severe when comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54.12
These results are helpful for our identification strategy as they reveal which groups
of non-eligible workers are more likely to identify UI market externalities. Workers aged
30 to 40 seem to fill vacancies that have characteristics that are very different from the
vacancies filled by eligible workers. But eligible and non-eligible workers above 50 seem
to fill vacancies that have very similar characteristics. This suggests that workers aged 30
to 40 are likely to be in a different job search market than eligible workers. As we move
towards older ages, workers seem to be in closer competition for the same vacancies as
eligible workers. For non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54, this competition seems the most
intense. As a consequence, in our baseline sample, we focus attention to workers with age
between 46 and 54 at the start of a spell.
Defining control labor markets To define control labor markets, we exploit primarily
the geographical dimension of REBP and use workers of non-REBP counties who have
similar characteristics as workers in our treated labor markets. This approach will only
be valid if labor markets in non-REBP counties are not too integrated to labor markets
less incentives to direct search differently or to discriminate between these different types of workers.
11Type I errors are particularly relevant in our context. They provide information about how likely it
is that a non-eligible worker is competing for a vacancy that has been “tailored” to eligible workers based
on its characteristics. In this sense, type I errors provide direct information about the intensity of the
competition that eligible workers receive from various groups of non-eligible workers when a vacancy is
opened in “their” search market.
12Because classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each component group, and always favors
classification into the larger group, the classification error measures of panel B should still be interpreted
with caution. We therefore tend to prefer goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel A.
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in REBP counties. Otherwise, workers in non-REBP counties might also be subject to
treatment externalities, which would bias towards zero the externalities estimated from
comparing non-eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties.
To get a sense of how geographically integrated the labor markets of REBP and non-
REBP counties are, we compute the fraction of new hires in non-REBP counties who
come from REBP counties. In figure 2 panel A, we map the average quarterly fraction
of men aged 46 to 54 coming from REBP counties in the total number of new hires of
men aged 46 to 54 in non-REBP regions for all the years when the REBP was not in
place (1980-1988 and 1998-2009). There are few counties where this fraction is above
5% and only in a handful of counties is this fraction above 20%. Most of these counties
are located in a narrow bandwidth, at a distance of 20 to 30 minutes to the border of
REBP counties. Because workers in these counties face competition from workers coming
from REBP counties, they might be affected by spillover effects of the REBP program.
Thus, in our baseline sample, we remove the few counties with more than 5% of new hires
coming from REBP regions. In our robustness analysis, we use these counties to show
that we can also detect the presence of geographical externalities in these counties highly
integrated to REBP regions.
In figure 2 panel B, we map the average quarterly fraction of men aged 46 to 54
coming from non-REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54
in REBP counties for all years when the REBP was not in place. This measures the
degree of competition from non-REBP workers faced by workers in REBP counties. The
map shows that this competition is on average limited, except for a few counties close
to the REBP border. Panel B shows that there is interesting variation in the openness
of REBP counties to non-REBP residents, which creates variation in treatment intensity
across REBP counties that we use in section IV.
Identifying assumption To identify UI externalities, our strategy relies on comparing
workers in REBP counties who are non-eligible (because of failing either the age or the
experience requirement) to similar workers in non-REBP counties. This diff-in-diff strat-
egy relies on a parallel trend assumption for non-eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP
counties.
The main concern with regard to our parallel trend assumption is the presence of
region-specific shocks in REBP vs non-REBP counties contemporaneous to the REBP
program. Indeed, as stated in section II, treated regions were chosen because of their
higher share of employment in the steel sector that was being restructured. To address
this issue, we start our analysis on a sample restricted to non-steel workers only, which
means workers who are never observed working in the steel sector, either before, during
or after the REBP. Because the steel sector only accounts for at most 15% of employment
in REBP counties, the spillover effects of the restructuring can be assumed to be small
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on industries not directly related to the steel industry supply chain. We show compelling
graphical evidence in favor of our parallel trend assumption in the next section. We also
provide in our sensitivity analysis several robustness tests to control for region-specific
shocks and to explore the sensitivity of our results to this sample restriction.
Descriptive statistics Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of our baseline estimation
sample for the REBP and non-REBP periods. In panel A, we compare REBP and non-
REBP counties and begin by showing simple labor market indicators for REBP and
non-REBP counties. Regions participating in the REBP program are not chosen at
random, but because of the importance of their steel sector. The average quarterly fraction
of employment in the steel sector in REBP counties was 15% versus 5% in non-REBP
counties. To control for the potential endogeneity bias in the choice of REBP counties,
we remove the steel sector from our baseline estimation sample. More specifically, we
get rid of all unemployed who ever worked in the steel sector prior to or after becoming
unemployed. The monthly unemployment rate for the 46 to 54 years old was the same
on average (5.5%) in REBP and non-REBP counties during non-REBP years.
In the remainder of table 1 panel A, we show descriptive statistics on our estimation
sample of unemployed men, aged 46 to 54, who never work in the steel sector. In our
sample, the fraction of unemployed eligible to REBP (above 50 years old or with more
than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years) is between 40 and 50%.
REBP and non-REBP counties are extremely similar for all non-REBP years in terms
of labor market outcomes: the duration of unemployment spells and the duration of
non-employment spells were roughly the same for unemployed in REBP and non-REBP
counties.13 Gross unconditional wages were slightly higher in REBP counties.
In table 1 panel B, we display descriptive statistics for eligible and non-eligible unem-
ployed workers in REBP counties in our estimation sample of unemployed men, aged 46
to 54 outside the steel sector. Eligible unemployed are defined as unemployed aged above
50 at the start of their spell or with more than 15 years of work history in the past 25
years, who reside in REBP counties and whose previous employer was also in a REBP
county. Non-eligible unemployed are those who were below 50 at the start of their spell
or who have worked less than 15 years out of the previous 25 years. Eligible workers are
therefore slightly older in our sample, but have similar job search outcomes. Non-eligible
unemployed have a slightly lower duration of unemployment during the non-REBP pe-
riod. Non-eligible unemployed had slightly lower unconditional gross real wages, but had
equivalent level of education, and were also similar in terms of other socio-demographic
characteristics such as education or marital status.
13All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Non-employment is defined as the number of weeks
between two employment spells. Unemployment duration is the duration of paid unemployment recorded
in the UI administrative data.
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IV Empirical evidence of market externalities
Graphical evidence We begin by providing graphical evidence of the presence of ex-
ternalities of the REBP program on non-eligible unemployed workers in REBP counties.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the difference in unemployment duration between REBP
and non-REBP counties for eligible and non-eligible workers. More specifically, for each
group of workers (eligible workers in panel A, all non-eligible workers aged 46 to 54 in panel
B, and non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54 in panel C), we run the following regression:
yit =
∑
βt1[T = t] +
∑
dt(1[T = t] · 1[M = 1]) +X ′γ + εit (2)
where 1[T = t] is an indicator for the start of the unemployment spell being in year t
and 1[M = 1] is an indicator for residing in a county treated with REBP. The vector of
controls X include education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in
previous job. We plot in figure 3 for each group of workers the estimated coefficients dt
which gives us the difference between REBP and non-REBP regions. In all panels, the
first red vertical line denotes the beginning of the REBP program, and the two dashed
red vertical lines denote the last entry into REBP program at the end of July 1993, and
the end of the REBP program when eligible unemployed exhaust their last REBP-related
benefits.
Panel A plots the estimated difference dt each year between REBP and non-REBP
counties for workers above age 50 with more than 15 years of continuous work history, and
therefore eligible for the REBP. Figure 3 shows that the introduction of program induced a
large reduction in labor supply of eligible workers in treated regions, which translates into
a large increase in unemployment durations. This difference in unemployment duration
disappears for workers entering unemployment from 1994 on, when the REBP no longer
accepted new entrants. Year 1993 can therefore be seen as the peak of the program effect
on aggregate labor supply, since this is the moment where the stock of REBP-eligible
unemployed is the highest, and the labor supply of treated workers is the lowest.
Panel B plots the difference across REBP and non-REBP regions for all non-eligible
workers aged 46 to 54 (below 50 years old or with less than 15 years of continuous work
history in the past 25 years), we see the opposite pattern taking place. After the intro-
duction of the REBP, non-eligible workers in REBP regions tend to experience shorter
unemployment spells, and a higher exit rate out of unemployment. This effect culminates
in 1993, when the effect of the REBP on aggregate labor supply of eligible workers is at
its peak. The difference then reverts back to zero as the REBP program is scaled down.
Panel C plots the difference across REBP and non-REBP regions focusing on non-
eligible workers aged 50 to 54 (with less than 15 years of continuous work history in the
past 25 years). The exact same pattern is visible, and even more pronounced. While
they experience similar unemployment durations prior to the REBP, non-eligible workers
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above 50 experience much shorter unemployment spells during the REBP period in REBP
regions compared to similar non-eligible workers in non-REBP regions, and the effect
culminates in 1993. The difference then quickly reverts back to zero as the REBP program
is rolled back.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between age and unemployment durations for all non-
eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties when REBP was not in place (panel
A), and the peak period when REBP was in action (January 1992 to December 1995,
panel B). The figure presents the average duration of unemployment in bins of age at the
start of unemployment where the bin size is two months of age. In REBP counties, to
make the distinction more visible between non-eligible workers due to age (below 50) and
due to work experience only (age 50 to 54), we plot them in different marker shapes. We
also fit the data with a third-order polynomial for REBP and non-REBP counties.
Panel A shows that during the non-REBP period, the relationship between age and
unemployment duration is almost flat and extremely similar for non-eligible workers in
REBP and non-REBP regions. Panel B shows that non-eligible workers experienced
shorter unemployment spells in REBP regions compared to non-REBP regions. Interest-
ingly, this difference in unemployment duration between REBP and non-REBP counties
is sharply increasing with age: unemployed individuals below 45 in REBP regions do
not fare very differently from similar unemployed in non-REBP regions during the REBP
period, but unemployed individuals above 50 in REBP counties experienced much shorter
spells than similar unemployed in non-REBP counties.
Baseline results In table 2, we present results summing up our graphical evidence, by
estimating models of the following form:
Yit = α +
Effect of REBP on eligible︷ ︸︸ ︷
β0 ·H ·M · T˜t +
Effect of REBP on non-eligible︷ ︸︸ ︷
γ0 · (1−H) ·M · Tt +η0 ·M +
∑
νt
+η1 ·H+ η2 ·M ·H+
∑
ιt ·H+X ′itρ+ εit (3)
where Yit are different search outcomes of interest, M is an indicator for residing in a REBP
county,14 Tt is an indicator for spells starting between June 1988 and July 1997, and T˜t
is an indicator for spells starting between June 1988 and July 1993. H is an indicator of
REBP-eligibility and is equal to one for unemployed individuals above 50 years old and
with more than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years at the time they
become unemployed. β0 identifies the effect of the REBP on eligible workers, while γ0
identifies spillovers of the REBP on non-eligible workers in REBP regions.
∑
νt is a series
of year fixed effects. Because we control for eligibility fixed effects (H) interacted with
14We remove the few observations of individuals who reside in REBP counties and whose previous
employer was in a non-REBP county, since their eligibility to the REBP changed in 1991.
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both the REBP-county indicator (M) and year fixed effects, specification (3) amounts to
pooling two diff-in-diffs together, one for the REBP effect on eligible unemployed workers
and one for the REBP effect on non-eligible unemployed workers.
In column (1) of table 2, we estimate this model without any other controls. In column
(2) we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry codes, family
status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we also add controls
for preexisting trends by region. Panel A displays estimates of β0, the diff-in-diff estimate
of the effect of the REBP on eligible workers. Results confirm that the REBP increased
unemployment duration by roughly 45 weeks for eligible unemployed compared to similar
unemployed workers in non-REBP counties. In column (4), we estimate the same model
using as an outcome the duration of total non-employment (conditional on finding a job at
the end of the unemployment spell). The direct effect of the REBP on eligible unemployed
is a little smaller in magnitude (+29 weeks), which suggests that some eligible workers
did exhaust their unemployment benefits and never got back to work. Columns (5) and
(6) focus on the probability of having a spell longer than 100 and 26 weeks respectively,
and confirm that the REBP shifted the whole survival function of unemployed eligible to
the REBP.
Panel B displays estimates of γ0, the REBP effect on all non-eligible workers aged 46
to 54 in REBP counties.15 Results confirm that non-eligible workers in REBP counties
experienced a significant decrease in their unemployment duration of 2 to 4 weeks com-
pared to similar workers in non-REBP counties. Column (4) shows that the effect is of
similar magnitude on the duration of total non-employment which means that the positive
REBP effect on non-eligible workers is truly about finding a job faster. Columns (5) and
(6) show that the reduction in unemployment durations for non-eligible unemployed is
due to a significant reduction in both short and long unemployment spells.
Section III has shown that we should expect heterogeneity in the magnitude of exter-
nalities across different groups of non-eligible workers. In particular, non-eligible workers
above 50 seem the most likely to compete for the same vacancies as workers eligible to
the REBP and therefore more likely to experience larger externalities. To investigate het-
erogeneity in market externalities, we split the results between non-eligible workers based
on age and non-eligible workers based on the work history requirement. In panel C, we
focus on the REBP effect for non-eligible workers age 46 to 49 who are non-eligible based
on age. Results show that the REBP significantly reduced the duration of unemployment
and of total non-employment of non-eligible workers aged 46 to 49 by 2 to 3 weeks. Panel
15To flexibly correct for the presence of temporary common random shocks that may affect the entire
REBP region, or alternatively the entire non-REBP region, we cluster standard errors at the region-year
level. In appendix table 6, we also provide evidence of the robustness of our results to various inference
strategies. We have checked sensitivity of inference in three ways. First, we allow for clustering by
markets defined as county-by-industry-by-education cells. Second, we implement spatial HAC standard
errors as in Conley [1999]. Finally, we implemented permutation based standard errors as in Chetty et al.
[2014] and Lalive, Wuellrich and Zweimueller [2013]. All the details are provided in appendix C.
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D shows the REBP effect for non-eligible workers aged 50 or above who are non-eligible
based on the experience requirement. Results confirm our earlier graphical evidence show-
ing that market externalities for this group of non-eligible workers are larger. The REBP
significantly reduced the duration of unemployment and of total non-employment of non-
eligible workers above 50 by 6 to 9 weeks.
Robustness In appendix table 7, we start by exploring the sensitivity of our results to
our sample restrictions. In our baseline sample, we have excluded workers above 54 and
women to minimize the concern that male workers between 55 and 59 and female workers
can use REBP as a direct pathway to retirement. In panel A, we run specification 3 on a
sample including all men up to 59. In panel B, we also include women in the estimation
sample. In both panels, estimates are extremely similar to our baseline results, with
significant externalities on unemployment durations of non-eligible workers of 2 to 3.5
weeks. In panel C, we also include steel sector workers in the estimation sample, which
had been excluded from the baseline sample to alleviate the concern of non-parallel trends
between REBP and non-REBP counties.16 Estimated externalities on non-eligible workers
are again very similar to our baseline results. Given that steel sector workers represent a
relatively small fraction of treated labor markets in REBP counties, these results are not
very surprising.
The second potential concern with regard to our results is that unobserved charac-
teristics correlated with job search outcomes might change during the REBP period for
non-eligible workers. Such a change in unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers
would lead to a violation of our parallel trend assumption and bias our estimates of the
market externalities of the REBP on non-eligible workers. To investigate this concern,
we look at inflow rates into unemployment for eligible and non-eligible workers in REBP
regions versus non-REBP regions. We run the previous diff-in-diff model on the quarterly
log separation rate by region for all male workers age 46 to 54, broken down by REBP
eligibility status. Results are reported in column (1) of table 3. The REBP has had a
large positive effect on the log separation rate of eligible workers in REBP regions but
has not affected the log separation rate of non-eligible workers in REBP regions.17 In the
remainder of table 3, we look at the effect of REBP on characteristics that are likely to
be correlated with productivity and job search outcomes. In columns (2) and (3), we run
the diff-in-diff model of equation 3 on the log wage in previous job (prior to becoming
16Steel sector workers are defined as workers who ever had employment in the steel sector between
1980 and 2009.
17We discuss in online appendix section A.4 the theoretical consequences of this increase in the sepa-
ration rate of eligible workers. When layoffs are endogenous to UI, an increase in the separation rate of
eligible workers is equivalent to a downward shift in labor supply, and is therefore analogous to a decrease
in search effort. But an increase in the separation rate may also decrease labor demand by decreasing the
net return from opening vacancies. The relative magnitude of these two effects will therefore determine
if endogenous layoffs deepens or attenuates the effect of UI on equilibrium labor market tightness and
therefore the magnitude of market externalities.
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unemployed), controlling for observable characteristics. We cannot detect any effect of
the REBP program on the distribution of residual wages in previous job of non-eligible
workers in REBP regions. For eligible workers, there is a small though not significant
positive effect, which suggests that eligible unemployed who took up REBP had slightly
better wages in their previous job. In column (4) and (5) we look at the logarithm of
tenure in the previous job (prior to becoming unemployed). Again, we find almost no
effect for non-eligible workers and a small positive effect for eligible workers. Overall,
these findings alleviate the concern of an important change in unobserved characteristics
of non-eligible workers in REBP regions at the time of the REBP program.
The third concern with our baseline estimates is the possible presence of differential
region-specific shocks at the time the REBP program was in place. This concern is
valid given that REBP counties were not chosen at random but because of the relative
importance of their steel sector. Yet note that the fraction of steel sector employees never
exceeds 15% of the labor force in these counties, and we restrict our baseline sample to
individuals who never were employed in the steel sector. Also, because REBP counties
were experiencing a restructuring of the steel sector, we should expect the region-specific
shock to be negative during the REBP period for REBP counties, which would lead to
higher unemployment durations for non-eligible workers. In this sense, region-specific
shocks are likely, if anything, to bias downward the magnitude of our estimates of the
search externalities for non-eligible workers.
To further investigate the robustness of our results to the presence of region-specific
shocks, we use men below age 40 in REBP counties as a control, instead of workers from
non-REBP counties. To do so, we run on a sample restricted to unemployed aged 30 to
39 and 50 to 54 in REBP counties a diff-in-diff specification equivalent to equation (3)
where we replace M by A = 1[Age > 50]. This specification enables us to control for
shocks to the labor markets of REBP counties contemporaneous to the REBP that affect
all job seekers in the same way. Results are reported in appendix table 8. Estimated
externalities on non-eligible unemployed aged 50 to 54 are virtually unaffected compared
to table 2 panel D. This suggests that our estimated externalities are not driven by labor
market shocks specific to REBP counties and contemporaneous to the REBP period.
Treatment intensity The magnitude of market externalities depends on treatment
intensity, i.e. the relative size of the treated group of eligible unemployed compared to the
non-treated group of non-eligible workers (appendix A.2). To investigate how estimated
externalities vary with treatment intensity, we look at different measures of treatment
intensity and interact these measures with the REBP effect on non-eligible workers. The
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estimated specification is
Yit = α + β0 ·H ·M · T˜t + (γH0 · 1[Treat=High] + γL0 · 1[Treat=Low]) · (1−H) ·M · Tt
+η0 ·M +
∑
νt + η1 ·H+ η2 ·M ·H+
∑
ιt ·H+X ′itρ+ εit
(4)
where 1[Treat=High] and 1[Treat=Low] are indicators for a proxy of treatment intensity
being above or below some threshold.
We use two methods to characterize treatment intensity. In the first method, we start
by computing the average quarterly fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties
among all new hires of men aged 46 to 54 for each REBP county when the REBP was
not in place as shown in figure 2 panel B. Counties that, absent REBP, had on average a
high fraction of hires coming from non-REBP regions have labor markets that are more
integrated to non-REBP regions and the REBP effect on aggregate search effort within
these counties is likely to be smaller than in counties that hardly ever hire individuals from
non-REBP regions. We define high treatment intensity counties as counties where the
fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties is lower than 5% which corresponds
to the median value across REBP counties. Table 4 panel A displays the results and shows
that the effect of REBP on non-eligible unemployed was significantly stronger in counties
with a low level of integration to non-REBP counties. REBP induced a reduction in non-
employment duration of non-eligible workers of only .7 weeks in low treatment counties
but of 4.2 weeks in high treatment counties. When zooming on non-eligible workers aged
50 and above, this pattern is even more striking, with a reduction in the average duration
of unemployment of 4 weeks for low treatment counties and of more than 10 weeks for
high treatment counties.
We confirm the robustness of these results using a second measure of treatment inten-
sity. We compute the average yearly fraction of eligible workers among the 50+ for each
region×industry×education cell during REBP years and define by high treatment inten-
sity a cell where the fraction of eligible 50+ unemployed was more than 90% (the median
value across all region×industry×education cells).18 Results are displayed in table 4 panel
B and confirm the pattern found using our first measure of treatment intensity. In low
treatment-intensity cells, the estimated externalities of REBP on non-eligible workers are
approximately two times smaller than in high treatment-intensity cells, and this pattern
is valid for all non-eligible workers, as well as for non-eligible workers above 50.
Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010] show that in the presence of “job rationing”,
externalities should be larger when initial labor market tightness is low as job rationing
will be more intense, exacerbating the rat race effect. In appendix table 9 we therefore
also explore heterogeneity in estimated externalities with respect to the initial level of
18A region is defined as the first two digits of the municipality identifiers.
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labor market tightness. Unfortunately, the first year for which we have some vacancy
information by county is 1990 and we cannot compute labor market tightness prior to
REBP. We compute initial labor market tightness as of 1990 by dividing the average
monthly number of vacancies posted in 1990 in each county×industry×education cell,
by the average monthly number of unemployed in the same county×industry×education
cell. And we define low tightness cells as county×industry×education cells where initial
tightness is below the median of initial tightness across all cells. Results, displayed in table
9, suggest that non-eligible workers in low tightness cells experienced significantly shorter
unemployment spells due to REBP than non-eligible workers in high initial tightness cells.
When focusing on non-eligible workers above 50, we also find strong suggestive evidence
that REBP externalities were significantly stronger in labor markets with low tightness
at the start of REBP.
Geographical spillovers So far, we have excluded from our sample unemployed resid-
ing in non-REBP counties that had labor markets highly integrated to REBP counties
before the REBP. These counties are likely to experience spillover effects from REBP
counties and cannot serve as a proper control in our diff-in-diff strategy. We now inves-
tigate directly whether we can detect the presence of REBP externalities on unemployed
workers residing in these counties. We begin by running a simple diff-in-diff specification
comparing unemployed workers residing in non-REBP counties with high integration to
REBP counties to unemployed workers residing in non-REBP counties with low level of
integration.19 We restrict our sample to male unemployed workers aged 50 to 54 with
more than 15 years of experience, who would be eligible to the REBP if residing in REBP
counties. Results are reported in panel A of table 5 and suggest that the REBP reduced
the duration of unemployment spells by 4 weeks for unemployed workers in non-REBP
counties with high labor market integration to REBP counties relative to similar workers
in non-REBP counties with little labor market integration to REBP counties.
In panel B of table 5, we use a finer measure of labor market integration by looking
at county×industry×education cells, and we compare unemployed workers in cells where
the average fraction of hires from REBP counties in total yearly hires was larger than
20% before the REBP to unemployed in cells where it was lower than 20%. Our estimates
show that the REBP significantly improved job search outcomes for unemployed workers
in cells where competition with REBP workers was the strongest: unemployed in these
cells experienced a decline in unemployment duration of 2.5 to 5 weeks relative to similar
workers residing in cells with low competition from REBP workers.
19High integration to REBP counties is defined as having an average quarterly fraction of new hires
coming from REBP regions in the total number of new hires above 15% for all non-REBP periods.
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Wages The sign and magnitude of our estimated REBP market externalities suggest
that wages did not react much to outside options of eligible workers. Higher wages would
have triggered a decrease in the number of job vacancies opened by firms and would have
muted or even reversed the externalities on non-eligible workers. Here, we investigate
explicitly this question by looking at the REBP effect on reemployment wages of eligible
workers.
Analyzing the REBP effect on wages is very different from our previous market ex-
ternality analysis, as we now wish to compare eligible workers to non-eligible workers.
Identification of the effect on wages is difficult for at least three reasons. First, the REBP
increases unemployment duration for eligible workers, which may directly affect wages
through duration dependence effects. Second, REBP treatment affects the probability of
entering into unemployment and REBP recipients may therefore be selected along unob-
served characteristics that are correlated with wages. Treatment is also correlated with
the probability of ever reentering the labor force, which creates additional selection issues.
Finally, the REBP affects labor market tightness, which will in turn affect the bargaining
power of workers.
Given these difficulties, our analysis remains tentative and most of the details and
caveats are discussed more extensively in appendix section D. We start by comparing
eligible workers in REBP counties and non-REBP counties. Because eligible workers
in REBP counties experienced longer unemployment durations during the REBP than
eligible workers in non-REBP counties, reemployment wages of eligible workers in REBP
and non-REBP counties may simply differ because of variations in the distribution of wage
offers over the duration of a spell. To control for this issue, we follow the methodology
of Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012a] and estimate the effect of variations in
benefits on reemployment wages holding unemployment duration constant. Identification
is based on the assumption that there is no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
and unemployment benefits conditional on unemployment duration.
We plot in appendix figure 6 post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of
the unemployment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties for eligible workers (aged 50 to
54 with more than 15 years of experience). The difference between REBP and non-REBP
counties at each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared to the
same difference in panel A (when REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate
of the REBP effect on reemployment wages conditional on spell duration. This evidence
suggests that there was no significant REBP effect on reemployment wages.
We formally assess this result in appendix table 10 by running a simple diff-in-diff
model where we compare workers eligible to the REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers
(control). Each panel uses a different control group. In panel A, we use workers aged 50
to 54 with more than 15 years of experience but residing in non-REBP regions. In panel
B we use workers aged 50 to 54 residing in REBP regions but with less than 15 years
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of experience. In panel C we use workers aged 46 to 49 with 15 years of experience and
residing in REBP regions. In our preferred specification of column (4), we condition on the
duration of unemployment using a rich set of dummies for the duration of unemployment
prior to finding a new job. Irrespective of the control group we are using, we always find
no significant REBP effect on reemployment wages.20
Overall, this evidence, although tentative, suggests that wages of eligible workers did
not strongly respond to the REBP, which is in line with the market externalities that we
find. Yet, we cannot exclude that these results are confounded by selection, nor can we
exclude that wages would have adjusted in the very long run.
V Discussion and policy implications
Micro versus macro effects of UI extensions Our empirical findings have important
policy implications. The overall effect of a change in UI on the job finding rate (the
macro effect of UI), is the sum of the micro effect and of market externalities. The
presence of significant market externalities implies that the micro and the macro effect of
UI extensions are not the same. Estimates of the effects of UI benefits on search effort
using variation in UI across individuals within a labor market capture micro effects of UI
and do not provide enough information to assess the full welfare implications of variations
in UI benefits.
Importantly, our analysis also offers direct insights on the relative magnitude of micro
and macro effects of variations in benefits in a labor market. We are interested in recov-
ering the wedge between micro and macro effects when changing UI for the whole labor
market. This wedge is W = 1 − eM/em where eM is the total effect on job finding rate
of treating the whole market by an increase dB in UI benefits (“macro effect”) and em is
the “micro effect”. This wedge can be recovered from our two groups quasi-experimental
setting (appendix A.2):
W =
1
p
dDb
dBa
dDa
dBa
− dDb
dBa
(5)
The numerator dDb
dBa
is the effect of the REBP increase in UI, dBa, for eligible workers on
the duration of unemployment of non-eligible workers, Db, and captures REBP market
externalities. Intuitively, because the effect of REBP on non-treated workers will create
externalities that are smaller than if the whole market was treated, one needs to rescale
20To complement our diff-in-diff approach, in appendix D we also exploit the age eligibility discontinuity
at 50 and the experience eligibility discontinuity in REBP counties to estimate RD effects of the REBP
extensions controlling for the effect of duration on reemployment wages by adding a rich set of dummies
for the duration of the spell prior to finding the job. Results suggest the presence of no wage effect
using the experience discontinuity, and a small significant elasticity of wages with respect to UI benefits
when using the age discontinuity. Note however that the McCrary test strongly rejects continuity in the
probability density function of age) at the cutoff (50 years) during the REBP period, which suggests that
the estimated wage effects could partly be driven by selection (sorting) at the 50 years age cut-off.
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estimated externalities in our experiment by 1/p where p is the fraction of eligible workers
in the market. The denominator is the micro effect of REBP. It is equal to the total effect
of REBP on the spell duration of eligible workers dDa
dBa
minus REBP externalities identified
by dDb
dBa
.
We can now calibrate the wedge W of equation (5) for the labor market of eligible 50
to 54 in REBP regions. To calibrate the numerator dDb
dBa
, we use the externalities estimate
γ0 of table 2 column (4) for non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54: γ0 = −6.91. These non-
eligible workers are the most likely to be competing in the same labor market as eligible
workers and of capturing the full extent of externalities in this labor market. For dDa
dBa
, we
use the estimate of the full effect of REBP on eligible workers β0 from table 2 column (4):
β0 = −29.17. For p, we use the average fraction of eligible workers among 50-54 workers
in REBP regions prior to REBP ≈ .9. This gives us a wedge of W ≈ .21.
To what extent is this wedge informative about the micro and macro effects of treat-
ing all labor markets by having a country-wide or region-wide unemployment insurance
extension? To answer this question, it is important to realize that, compared to a setting
where all labor markets would be treated, in the REBP setting, some untreated labor
markets (for workers aged below 50 for instance) are offering substitution opportunities
to treated workers. We explain in appendix section A.3 the consequences of the existence
of substitution possibilities across markets on the magnitude of market externalities of
UI. The intuition is that when the treated labor market is small, and the elasticity of
substitution with workers from other markets is large, then the treated market is like a
small open economy: its labor market tightness is close to infinitely elastic and set by the
labor market tightness of substitution markets. Labor market tightness in the treated
market will therefore not react strongly to variations in UI for workers in that market and
market externalities of UI will be small. In other words, the more substitutes are available
for firms, the smaller the market externalities of UI in the treated market. This suggests
that the wedge between the micro and macro effects of country-wide or region-wide UI
extensions could be greater than the wedge we found in the REBP context for the treated
market of male workers aged 50 to 54.
Implications for welfare effects of UI extensions Our results bear important im-
plications for optimal UI policies. As explained in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010], in
equilibrium search and matching models, the traditional partial equilibrium Baily-Chetty
formula for the optimal level of benefits (Chetty [2006]) needs to be extended to take
into account the difference between partial equilibrium (micro) and macro effects of UI
benefits which captures equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness. The reason is
that, when the Hosios condition does not hold and the economy is inefficient, UI-induced
variations in labor market tightness will have first-order welfare effects by affecting work-
ers’ job-finding probability per unit of effort. When the economy is slack, more UI is
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desirable if UI increases tightness and less UI is desirable if UI decreases tightness.
Given that we find a positive wedge between the micro and the macro effects, this
implies that more generous UI increases labor market tightness. As a consequence, the
optimal level of UI will be larger than suggested by the partial equilibrium Baily-Chetty
formula. UI extensions are less distortionary than based on estimation of micro estimates
of the effects of UI.
Our results in appendix table 9 further suggest that market externalities are larger
when initial labor market tightness is low. This would imply that the wedge between micro
and macro effects is likely to be larger during recessions (low tightness) than during booms
(high tightness). This would therefore offer a natural justification for countercyclical
extensions of UI on efficiency grounds, as hypothesized in Landais, Michaillat and Saez
[2010].
Market externalities are likely to be larger in the short run. There are two potential
reasons for this. First, in the short run, returns to labor are more likely to be decreasing
(capital not being able to adjust as quickly as labor fluctuations). Second, because of
various frictions in the wage-setting process, it might take time for wages to adjust to a
change in UI benefits. Our empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that even after three
to four years, positive REBP externalities are still detectable on non-eligible workers. Be-
cause the REBP program was only temporary, we cannot properly estimate the speed at
which externalities may decrease over time. In the long run, however, it is possible that
these externalities would have decreased. First, because, as suggested by appendix figure
7, it seems that wages started to react more to REBP extensions over time. Second, in
the long run, labor demand is likely to become more elastic to labor market tightness
as returns to labor are more likely to become constant. Eventually, it is even possible
that externalities change sign in the long run, so that the macro effect of UI variations
becomes larger than the micro effect.21 In terms of policy implications, this means that
temporary extensions enacted in reaction to business cycles downturns are less socially
costly than previously thought. And when determining the optimal time span of tempo-
rary extensions, governments should pay attention to the evolution of market externalities
over time.
21This may explain why cross-sectional estimates comparing countries or US states tend to find much
larger elasticities than reform-based (short term) estimates. This may also explain why, European coun-
tries with generous UI coverage experience high level of structural long term unemployment despite the
fact that most reform-based estimates in Europe find relatively modest elasticities in the short run.
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Figure 1: Evaluating the degree of competition for identical vacancies be-
tween REBP eligible workers and different groups of non-eligible work-
ers:
A. Goodness-of-fit tests
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Notes:This figure reports various goodness-of-fit measures of a logit model where the REBP-eligibility status of the worker filling a vacancy
is explained by all the characteristics of the vacancy. We estimate this model separately for different groups of non-eligible workers against
eligible workers. A good fit of the model indicates that non-eligible workers fill vacancies that are very different from the vacancies filled by
eligible workers. A poor goodness-of-fit indicates that eligible and non-eligible workers fill vacancies that have very similar characteristics. In
panel A, we plot the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit tests for the logit model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness of fit test and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow χ2 goodness of fit test. A low p-value indicates poor fit and low predictive value of the model. In panel B, we plot the fraction
of observations that are misclassified by our model (the predicted status is different from the true status of the worker filling the vacancy).
We also plot the fraction of type I errors of the model. The classification error measures of panel B should be interpreted with caution as
classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each group of workers. We therefore tend to prefer goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel
A. All the details are given in the online appendix section B.
Figure 2: Regional distribution of REBP and local labor market integra-
tion during non-REBP years (1980-1988 and 1998-2009)
A. Fraction of new hires from REBP regions in total number of new hires by county
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Notes: the figure shows the distribution of REBP across the 2361 communities (counties) in Austria.
The treated regions (REBP regions) are all counties with red shading in panel B and include parts
of the provinces of Burgenland, Carinthia (Ka¨rnten), Lower Austria (Niedero¨sterreich), Upper Austria
(Obero¨sterreich), and Styria (Steiermark). Both panels also give important information about the level of
local labor market integration across REBP and non-REBP regions. Panel A maps the average quarterly
fraction of men aged 46 to 54 coming from REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged
46 to 54 in non-REBP counties for all years when the REBP was not in place. The map shows
that the degree of competition from REBP workers faced by workers in non-REBP counties is very small,
except for a few counties close to the border. To make sure our control and treatment regions are isolated
labor markets we remove from our estimation sample the few counties with more than 5% of new hires
coming from REBP regions. Panel B maps the average quarterly fraction of men aged 46 to 54 coming
from non-REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54 in REBP counties for all
years when the REBP was not in place. This measures the degree of competition from non-REBP
workers faced by workers in REBP counties. The map shows that this competition is relatively small
except for a few counties close to the REBP border.
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Figure 3: Difference in unemployment durations between REBP and non-
REBP counties by year of entry into unemployment:
A. Eligible unemployed
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Notes: The figure plots dt, the yearly average difference in unemployment duration (in weeks) between REBP and non-REBP counties,
obtained from regression specification 2, where controls include education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous
job. The reference year is 1981. Standard errors cluster at the region × year level. Sample includes all unemployed individuals between 46
and 54 in REBP and non-REBP counties. Non-REBP counties with high labor market integration to REBP regions are excluded from the
sample. Panel A plots the difference for workers above 50 with more than 15 years of work history in the past 25 years prior to becoming
unemployed, who are therefore eligible for REBP. Panel B plots the difference for all non-eligible workers (less than 50 and/or less than 15
years of work history). Panel C plots the difference for non-eligible workers based on work history only (above 50 but less than continuous 15
years of work history). See text for details.
Figure 4: Unemployment durations as a function of age in REBP and non-
REBP counties for non-eligible unemployed:
A. Before and after REBP
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Un
em
plo
ym
en
t d
ur
at
ion
 (w
ee
ks
)
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
Age
REBP regions
REBP regions, exp<15 yrs
Non-REBP regions
B. During peak of REBP (1992-1995)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Un
em
plo
ym
en
t d
ur
at
ion
 (w
ee
ks
)
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
Age
REBP regions
REBP regions, exp<15 yrs
Non-REBP regions
Notes: the figure plots the relationship between age and unemployment durations for all non-eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties
when REBP was not in place (panel A), and during the peak of the REBP period (January 1992 to December 1995). We plot the average
duration of unemployment in bins of age at the start of unemployment where the bin size is two months of age. In REBP counties, to make
the distinction more visible between non-eligible workers due to age (below 50) and due to work experience only (age 50 to 54), we plot
them in different marker shapes. We fit the data with a third-order polynomial for REBP and non-REBP counties. Panel A shows that
during the non-REBP period, the relationship between age and unemployment duration is extremely similar for non-eligible workers in REBP
and non-REBP regions. Panel B shows that during the peak of the REBP period (January 1992 to December 1995) non-eligible workers
experienced shorter unemployment spells in REBP regions compared to non-REBP regions. And this difference in unemployment duration is
sharply increasing with age.
Table 1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. REBP vs non-REBP counties
Non-REBP period REBP period
Non-REBP REBP Non-REBP REBP
counties counties Difference p-value counties counties Difference p-value
Fraction employed in the steel sector .055 .152 -.097 0 .057 .156 -.099 0
Monthly 46-54 unemployment rate .055 .054 .001 .864 .073 .113 -.04 0
Fraction eligible to REBP .382 .396 -.014 0 .449 .533 -.084 0
Age 49.7 49.7 0 .343 49.8 50.1 -.3 0
Unemployment duration 13.6 14.3 -.7 0 15.9 29 -13.1 0
Non employment duration 22.7 21.2 1.4 0 32.9 45.4 -12.4 0
Wage before U spell (e2000) 13448 14306 -857 0 13122 14498 -1375 0
B. Eligible vs non-eligible unemployed in REBP counties
Non-REBP period REBP period
Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible Eligible
unemployed unemployed Difference p-value unemployed unemployed Difference p-value
Age 48.2 51.9 -3.7 0 48 52 -4 0
Unemployment duration 17.5 20.8 -3.2 0 23.2 88.8 -65.6 0
Non employment duration 21.6 24.7 -3.1 0 31.4 99.6 -68.2 0
Wage before U spell (e2000) 14096 14623 -527 0 13316 15549 -2232 0
Fraction with compulsory education .529 .501 .028 0 .511 .506 .005 .44
Fraction married .744 .751 -.007 .076 .748 .803 -.055 0
Notes: The table displays summary statistics from the Austrian social security and unemployment insurance files. Panel A compares REBP and non-REBP counties in the non-REBP period (1980 to May 1988 and
August 1997 to 2009) and during the REBP period (June 1988 to July 1997). P-value is for a test of equality of means for REBP and non-REBP counties. The fraction of employment in the steel sector is defined as the
average quarterly fraction of individuals aged 46 to 54 employed in the steel industry. The unemployment rate is the average monthly number of unemployed men aged 46 to 54 recorded in the unemployment insurance
files as a fraction of the sum of unemployed and employed male workers aged 46 to 54. All remaining rows in this table are computed for our estimation sample of unemployed workers which is restricted to men, aged
46 to 54, who never work in the steel sector. Panel B compares, in REBP counties, in the non-REBP period (1980 to May 1988 and August 1997 to 2009) and during the REBP period (June 1988 to July 1997), eligible
unemployed workers (above 50 and with more than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years) to non-eligible unemployed workers (with less than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years
or below 50). P-value is for a test of equality of means for these two groups. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Wages are annually adjusted and expressed in constant e2000. Non-employment is defined as
the number of weeks between two employment spells. Unemployment duration is the duration of paid unemployment recorded in the UI administrative data.
Table 2: Baseline estimates of the treatment effect of REBP on eligible
unemployed and non-eligible unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment duration Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Treatment effect on eligible unemployed
β0 47.13
∗∗∗ 43.35∗∗∗ 43.37∗∗∗ 29.17∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(5.602) (5.129) (5.069) (5.444) (0.0293) (0.0240)
N 267966 262344 262344 232135 262344 262344
B. Externality - all non-eligible unemployed
γ0 -2.462
∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗ -3.740∗∗∗ -2.327∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗
(0.818) (0.708) (0.758) (0.629) (0.00311) (0.00660)
N 267966 262344 262344 232135 262344 262344
C. Externality - non-eligible unemployed below 50
γ0 -2.004
∗∗ -1.446∗∗ -3.321∗∗∗ -2.030∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗
(0.829) (0.699) (0.616) (0.539) (0.00205) (0.00526)
N 254934 249894 249894 220754 249894 249894
D. Externality - non-eligible unemployed above 50
γ0 -6.638
∗∗∗ -6.124∗∗∗ -8.862∗∗∗ -6.913∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0494∗∗∗
(2.156) (2.194) (2.226) (2.100) (0.00915) (0.0142)
N 125088 122277 122277 102677 122277 122277
Educ., industry,
citizenship, × × × × ×
marital status
Region-specific × × × ×
trends
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. The table presents estimates of the model presented in
equation (3). β0 identifies the effect of REBP on eligible unemployed, while γ0 identifies spillovers of
REBP on non-eligible unemployed in REBP counties. In column (1), we estimate this model without
any other controls. In column (2) we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry
codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we add controls for
preexisting trends by region. Panel A presents the effect of REBP on labor market outcomes of eligible
workers. Panel B presents the effect of REBP on labor market outcomes of all non-eligible workers aged
46 to 54. In panel C, we focus on the effect of REBP for non-eligible workers age 46 to 50 who are non-
eligible based on age. For this specification, we exclude from the estimation sample non-eligible workers
based on experience. Panel D shows the effect of REBP for non-eligible workers age 50 or above who are
non-eligible based on the experience requirement. For this specification, we exclude from the estimation
sample workers with age below 50.
Table 3: Testing for selection: impact of REBP on inflow rate into unem-
ployment, log real wage in previous job and log tenure in previous job
of eligible and non-eligible unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log separation log real wage log tenure
rate in previous job in previous job
Eligible workers 0.286***
(0.0356)
Non-eligible workers 0.0162
(0.0218)
β0 (REBP effect on eligible) 0.109 0.128* 0.646*** 0.487***
(0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0767) (0.0563)
γ0 (REBP effect on non-eligible) 0.0110 -0.00873 -0.0450 -0.0581*
(0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0355) (0.0305)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × ×
N 3390 240947 240923 267929 267901
Notes: For columns (2) to (5), standard errors are clustered at the year×region level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The table investigates the presence of selection effects of the REBP program
affecting the distribution of unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers in REBP regions. Column
(1) presents the diff-in-diff effect of the REBP program on the quarterly log separation rate of eligible
and non-eligible workers in REBP regions compared to non-REBP regions. In this column, observations
are at the eligibility group×region×quarter level. In columns (2) to (5), sample include all unemployed
age 46 to 54. Columns (2) and (3) present specifications similar to that of table 2 but where the outcome
variable is the log wage in the previous job prior to becoming unemployed. Columns (4) and (5) repeat
the same regressions using the log tenure in previous job as an outcome.
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Table 4: Externalities on non-eligible unemployed by REBP-treatment in-
tensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
REBP effect on non-treated duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Treatment intensity - Method 1:
County share of hires from non-REBP counties
All non-eligible
γL0 (share of non-REBP hires > .05) -1.599** -0.676 -0.00275 -0.00289
(0.747) (0.693) (0.00224) (0.00661)
γH0 (share of non-REBP hires ≤ .05) -2.866*** -4.170*** -0.00612* -0.0266***
(0.844) (0.917) (0.00324) (0.00733)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0674] [0.0001] [0.138] [0.0002]
Non-eligible 50+
γL0 (share of non-REBP hires > .05) -4.048** -4.191* -0.00300 -0.0119
(1.894) (2.309) (0.00788) (0.0136)
γH0 (share of non-REBP hires ≤ .05) -15.24*** -10.66* -0.0519** -0.111***
(5.164) (5.831) (0.0230) (0.0372)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0245] [0.310] [0.0354] [0.00566]
B. Treatment intensity - Method 2:
Fraction treated in region×education×industry cell
All non-eligible
γL0 (fraction treated ≤ .9) -0.849 -1.022 0.00426 -0.00918
(0.933) (1.161) (0.00421) (0.00886)
γH0 (fraction treated > .9 ) -2.238*** -1.908** -0.00560* -0.0102
(0.828) (0.802) (0.00307) (0.00725)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.252] [0.545] [0.104] [0.928]
Non-eligible 50+
γL0 (fraction treated ≤ .9) -4.207 -3.661 -0.00126 -0.0351*
(2.807) (2.378) (0.0110) (0.0188)
γH0 (fraction treated > .9) -8.831*** -8.022*** -0.0274*** -0.0235
(2.016) (2.426) (0.00952) (0.0215)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0789] [0.0503] [0.0272] [0.668]
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers working in non-steel related sectors. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. The table
presents estimates of the effects of REBP on non-eligible workers broken down by REBP-treatment intensity. The estimated
specification is that of equation (4). γH0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-treated workers in high REBP-treatment intensity
regions, γL0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-treated workers in low REBP-treatment intensity regions. We use two methods to
characterize treatment intensity. Method 1 computes the average quarterly fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties
for each REBP county when the REBP was not in place and we define high treatment intensity counties as counties where the
fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties is lower than 5%, which corresponds to the median value across REBP
counties. Method 2 computes the average yearly fraction of eligible workers among the 50+ for each region×industry×education
cell during REBP years and we define high treatment intensity as being in a cell where more than 90% of the 50+ unemployed
were eligible, which is the median value across all region×industry×education cells. A region is defined as the first two digits of
the municipality identifiers.
Table 5: Geographical spillovers: Effect of REBP on unemployed work-
ers in non-REBP counties with high labor market integration to REBP
counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
Labor market integration - Measure 1:
Fraction of hires coming from REBP regions
in county cell
γ0 (geographical spillovers) -3.997*** -3.500** -1.043 -0.00658 -0.0239**
(1.428) (1.440) (1.439) (0.00558) (0.0119)
Labor market integration - Measure 2:
Fraction of hires coming from REBP regions
in county×industry×education cell
γ0 (geographical spillovers) -6.373*** -5.242*** -2.515*** -0.0141*** -0.0169***
(1.213) (1.109) (0.659) (0.00368) (0.00603)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
N 104881 102840 88702 102840 102840
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers aged 50-54 working in non-steel related sectors with more than 15 years
of experience in the past 25 years prior to becoming unemployed. All duration outcomes are expressed in
weeks. The table presents estimates of a simple diff-in-diff specification comparing unemployed workers
in non-REBP counties with high integration to REBP counties versus unemployed workers in non-REBP
counties with low level of integration as a control. In panel A, counties with high level of labor market
integration are defined as counties with an average quarterly fraction of new hires coming from REBP
regions in total number of new hires above 15% for all years when REBP was not in place. In panel
B, we use a finer measure of labor market integration by looking at county×industry×education cells,
and we compare unemployed workers in cells where the average fraction of hires from REBP counties in
total yearly hires was larger than 20% (for all years when REBP was not in place) to unemployed in cells
where it was lower than 20%.
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A Externalities in search and matching models and
their identification
The probability that an individual finds a job in a given time period t depends on how
hard that individual searches for a job and/or on how selective he is in his acceptance
decisions. It also depends on the aggregate labor market conditions that determine how
easy it is to locate jobs or to be matched to a potential employer for each unit of search
effort. These two forces are usually represented in equilibrium search and matching mod-
els by using the stylized decomposition: hit = eit · f(θt). h is the hazard rate out of
unemployment (the probability to find a job in period t for individual i). eit captures the
search effort / selectiveness component. θt is the ratio of job vacancies to total search
effort, and represents the tightness of the labor market. f(θt) therefore captures the effect
of labor market conditions on the job finding probability per unit of effort. If there are
no job vacancies created by employers, then f(θt) = 0 and no amount of search effort by
an unemployed worker would yield a positive probability of obtaining a job.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies affect the search intensity /selectiveness of
unemployed workers. We call this effect the micro effect of UI. It can be identified by
comparing two individuals with different levels of UI generosity in the same labor market.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies also affect the aggregate job finding rate per
unit of search effort through equilibrium effects. We call this second effect market exter-
nalities. It stems from equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness θt in response to
a change in UI generosity. The first aim of this appendix is to provide a simple theoretical
framework explaining the mechanisms shaping the sign and magnitude of these market
externalities. The second aim is to explain how to identify these market externalities
empirically.
We start by presenting a one group equilibrium to explain the forces shaping equi-
librium adjustments in labor market tightness in response to variations in UI. Then we
extend the model to a two-group equilibrium in order to explain how to identify market
externalities empirically and connect more closely the framework to the policy experiment
that we analyze in the paper. In particular, we detail how to choose groups of workers
to identify market externalities. We also explain how the sign and magnitude of market
externalities depend on the structure of the labor market treated by the change in UI
generosity and its connection to other labor markets.
The representation of the labor market that we use was developed by Michaillat [2012].
It is also strongly related to Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010], where search effort is en-
dogeneized and unemployment insurance is introduced in the model of Michaillat [2012].
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Readers are referred to these two papers for further details on the set-up and equilibrium
analysis.
A.1 One group equilibrium
The labor market is characterized by the presence of matching frictions. We normalize the
size of labor force to unity. We present a simplified, static equilibrium analysis of search
and matching models and characterize the comparative static for steady state equilibria.
To keep things simple, we assume throughout that all workers within a group get the
same wage. We start by looking at a one group equilibrium, as in Landais, Michaillat
and Saez [2010], where all workers are eligible to the same unemployment benefits B, and
explain the two main mechanisms that shape the equilibrium response in labor market
tightness to a variation in unemployment benefits: the rat race effect (or labor demand
effect) and the wage effect.
Unemployed workers face v vacancies opened by firms, and the total number of matches
realized is given by an aggregate matching function m(e · u, v) = ωm · (e · u)η ·v1−η. Labor
market tightness θ = v
e·u is defined as the ratio of vacancies to the aggregate search effort
in the labor market.
The individual job-finding probability is h = e · f(θ) = e ·m(1, θ), where e = e(B, θ) is
the optimal search effort of individuals given benefits and labor market tightness. Effort
is a decreasing function of unemployment benefits ∂e/∂B < 0. To further simplify the
presentation, we assume that ∂e
∂θ
= 0. The assumption that the elasticity of job search
effort with respect to the job-finding rate is close to zero seems reasonable empirically.
As emphasized by Shimer [2004] labor market participation and other measures of search
intensity are, if anything, slightly countercyclical even after controlling for changing char-
acteristics of unemployed workers over the business cycle. The job-finding probability is
an increasing function of θ (f ′(θ) > 0). From the definition of the matching function
we can also define the vacancy-filling probability for each vacancy opened by the firm
q(θ) = m(1/θ, 1) which is a decreasing function of labor market tightness ∂q(θ)
∂θ
< 0.
We denote by ns the probability that a worker is employed (and by u = 1 − ns the
corresponding unemployment probability). Using the steady state equality of flows in and
out of unemployment, we have that
ns =
ef(θ)
λ+ ef(θ)
(6)
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where λ is the exogenous separation rate. Following Michaillat [2012], we interpret
ns = ns(θ, e(B)) as a labor supply that we can represent as an increasing function of
θ in a {n, θ} diagram.
A representative firm maximizes profit pi = φ(n)−n ·w− r
q(θ)
·ψ ·n where φ(.) is total
output, n is employment and r is the recruiting cost of opening a vacancy. Firms take
labor market tightness as given, and for them it is equivalent to choose employment level
or the number of vacancies, given that v vacancies automatically translate into v · q(θ)
job creations. The first-order condition of the firm with respect to employment level n is:
φ′(n) = w +
rψ
q(θ)
(7)
Equation (7) implicitly defines a labor demand function nd(θ, w) whose properties
depend in particular on the assumptions made on φ(.) and on the wage setting pro-
cess defining w. These properties are important to determine the sign and magnitude
of externalities, as explained below. In particular, note that when technology exhibits
diminishing returns to labor, with φ′(n) > 0 and φ′′(n) < 0, we have by implicit differen-
tiation of equation (7): ∂n
d
∂θ
< 0. So in this case, labor demand will be a downward sloping
function of θ as in Michaillat [2012]. The intuition for this negative relationship between
labor demand and labor market tightness is the following: as labor market tightness goes
up, the cost of opening vacancies goes up, as it takes longer to fill vacancies. Firms will
post fewer vacancies, bringing their level of employment down, which will increase labor
productivity and restore the profit from opening vacancies. It is also immediate to see
that when technology is linear and in the absence of aggregate demand effects, equation
(7) implicitly defines labor demand as a perfectly elastic function of labor market tightness.
Note also that, depending on the wage setting process, labor demand implicitly defined
by equation (7) can also be a function of unemployment benefits. If wages are bargained
over and workers have limited bargaining power, then wages will react to outside options
of workers and thus to variations in unemployment benefits B: w = w(B). As can be
seen from equation (7), an increase in B leading to a increase in wages w will, everything
else equal, decrease the net return from opening a vacancy and lead to a decrease in labor
demand nd.
We can now define a labor market equilibrium by the condition:
ns(θ, e(B)) = nd(θ, w(B)) (8)
Market externalities:
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Equilibrium condition (8) defines θ as an endogenous variable, affected by the level
of benefits B of unemployed individuals in equilibrium. Because of this equilibrium ad-
justment of θ in response to a change in UI benefits, the effect of UI on the job finding
probability h = e · f(θ) can be decomposed into two parts, a micro-effect capturing the
change in search effort keeping labor market tightness constant and a “market external-
ity”, capturing the effect of the change in labor market tightness:
dh
dB
=
d(e · f(θ))
dB
=
∂e
∂B
· f(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Micro effect
+
Market externality︷ ︸︸ ︷
e · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθB (9)
where εθB =
dθ
dB
B
θ
is the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to the generosity
of UI B. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (9) is the market externality,
which is defined as the variation in the job finding rate caused by equilibrium adjustments
in labor market tightness, keeping search effort constant.
The reason why we call this effect a “market externality” instead of a mere incidence
effect is because, as shown in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010], these equilibrium
adjustments in labor market tightness have first-order welfare effects when the Hosios
condition is not met.
Equilibrium adjustment of θ in response to a change in UI benefits ( dθ
dB
) is given by
fully differentiating equation (8).
dθ
dB
=
∂nd
∂w
∂w
∂B
− ∂ns
∂B
∂ns
∂θ
− ∂nd
∂θ
(10)
Equation (10) can also be rewritten in terms of elasticities:
εθB =
εn
d
w · εwB − εnsB
εn
s
θ − εndθ
(11)
where the notation εXY refers to the elasticity of X w.r.t Y . From the previous equation,
we can now discuss the forces determining equilibrium adjustments of θ in response to a
change in benefits B. We focus in particular on two opposing forces: the rat-race effect
(or labor-demand effect), and the wage effect.
Rate race effect
The rate race effect is determined by the elasticity of labor-demand (εn
d
θ ). If labor
demand is downward sloping (εn
d
θ < 0) then the denominator in (11) is positive. Given
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that εn
s
B < 0, it follows that, conditional on wages, equilibrium labor market tightness will
increase when UI benefits increase εθB
∣∣
w
> 0. The more inelastic labor demand is with
respect to labor market tightness, the larger the rat race effect. If labor demand is fixed,
then the rat race effect is at its maximum: firms will fully compensate a UI-induced de-
crease in search effort by opening more vacancies to keep the level of employment constant.
Intuitively, a downward sloping labor demand (εn
d
θ < 0) captures the fact that the net
profits from opening vacancies are a decreasing function of employment. When search
effort decreases, it decreases labor supply, which increases the profits of opening vacancies
for firms: vacancies increase, which increases labor market tightness, and the probabil-
ity of finding a job per unit of effort increases for all workers. Landais, Michaillat and
Saez [2010] discuss various search and matching models and show under which conditions
such “rat race” effect is likely to arise. In particular, Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010]
show that technology can be an important factor. In the presence of diminishing returns
to labor, as explained above, labor demand is a downward sloping function of tightness
and the larger the diminishing returns to labor, the larger the labor demand effect on
equilibrium tightness. When technology is close to linear in labor, labor demand will in
general be close to perfectly elastic, and therefore εθB tends to zero. Note however that
diminishing returns is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the presence of a
downward sloping labor demand. Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010] show for instance
that an “aggregate demand model” with a quantity equation for money and nominal wage
rigidities will feature a downward sloping labor demand even with linear technology.
The rat race effect will be the only driver of labor market tightness adjustments to the
policy when wages do not react to the policy (εwB = 0). Studies estimating spillover effects
of active labor market programs such as training programs therefore tend to capture a
pure rat race effect as these training programs do not generally affect bargained wages.
Wage effect
If the wage setting process is such that wages depend on outside options of workers,
then an increase in UI benefits will increase wages εwB > 0, which will in turn affect the
vacancy posting behavior of firms. Higher wages will decrease the return from opening
vacancies for firms leading to a decrease in labor demand (εn
d
w < 0) and in turn, a decrease
in labor market tightness. We call this effect the wage effect (or job creation effect).
The wage effect is going in the opposite direction to the rate race effect. The overall effect
of a change in UI benefits on equilibrium labor market tightness will therefore depend
on the relative magnitude of these two effects. If the wage effect is large enough, the
numerator in (11) may become negative (εn
d
w ·εwB < εnsB < 0) and equilibrium labor market
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tightness will decrease in response to an increase in benefits. If the wage effect is small in
magnitude, then the rat race effect will dominate: the numerator in (11) will be positive
(εn
s
B < ε
nd
w · εwB < 0) and labor market tightness will increase in response to an increase in
UI benefits.
A.2 Identification of market externalities in a two group equi-
librium
Identification of the micro effect in equation (9) is relatively straightforward. The ideal
experiment is to offer higher unemployment benefits to a randomly selected and small
subset of individuals within a labor market and compare unemployment durations be-
tween these treated individuals and the other jobseekers. In practice, the micro effect is
estimated by comparing individuals with different benefits in the same labor market at a
given time, while controlling for individual characteristics.
Identification of market externalities in equation (9) is more complicated, in large part
due to the lack of good measures of labor market tightness.22 We show here how one can
use labor market outcomes of different group of workers in the same labor market to iden-
tify market externalities of UI benefits. We introduce two groups of workers a and b and
assume there are p workers of group a who are eligible to unemployment benefits Ba and
1−p workers workers of group b who are eligible to unemployment benefit Bb. The group
shares p and 1− p are exogenously given. We start from a situation where Ba = Bb and
look at the effect on the steady state equilibrium of an increase in benefits for workers of
group a: dBa > 0.
We denote by nsa (resp. n
s
b) the probability that a worker of group a (resp. b) is
employed (and by ua = 1 − nsa the corresponding unemployment probability) There are
u = ua + ub unemployed workers. When unemployed, each individual worker exerts some
effort ei = e(Bi), i = (a, b), where e is a decreasing function of benefits received B.
Workers of both groups are assumed to be in the same labor market and we define a
labor market as the place where workers compete for the same job vacancies.
A labor market is therefore characterized by a unique labor market tightness in equilib-
rium, and matching is random between identical job vacancies posted by firms and all the
22A notable exception is Marinescu [2014] who uses very detailed information on vacancies and job
applications from CareerBuilder.com, the largest American online job board, to compute the effects of
UI extensions on aggregate search effort (e · u) measured by job applications and on vacancy posting (v)
at the state level. She finds a negative effect of UI extensions on job applications but no effect of UI
extensions on vacancy posting. Since θ = v/(e · u), these results imply that more generous UI benefits
increase labor market tightness.
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(potentially different) workers who apply for these identical vacancies. From the firms’
point of view, this means that when opening vacancies, firms take as given labor supply
of group a and group b, and opening v vacancies translates into p ·na/q(θ) jobs of workers
from group a and (1− p)nb/q(θ) jobs of workers from group b. Wages are determined at
the individual level, once the match is done and depends on the outside option of each
worker. We therefore allow for two different wage levels wa and wb for both groups of
workers in equilibrium.
This definition of labor market is the most natural definition from a search theoretic
standpoint. As labor market tightness (and not the wage rate) is the “price” variable
equating labor supply and labor demand in labor market characterized by search fric-
tions, our definition of a labor market strictly follows the law of one price. From an
empirical perspective, this definition captures the fact that a labor market is the place
where workers compete for the same jobs.
As in the one group case before, firms choose the level of employment that maximizes
profits, which is equivalent to choosing the number of vacancies to open in order to
maximize profits (taking labor market tightness as given). There is only one labor market
tightness for the two groups of workers, so opening v vacancies translates into p · na/q(θ)
jobs of workers from group a and (1− p) · nb/q(θ) jobs of workers from group b. We can
therefore write firms profits as:
pi = φ
(
p ·na, (1−p) ·nb
)
−p ·na ·wa− (1−p) ·nb ·wb− r
q(θ)
·ψ · (p ·na + (1−p) ·nb) (12)
p
{
∂φ
∂na
− wa − rψ
q(θ)
}
+ (1− p)
{
∂φ
∂nb
− wb − rψ
q(θ)
}
= 0 (13)
Similarly to equation (7), equation (13) implicitly defines the optimal employment level
demanded by firms as a function of labor market tightness θ. Importantly, equation (13)
defines the optimal employment level nd = pnda + (1 − p)ndb as a weighted sum of the
optimal employment level of workers of group a and group b. In other words, the labor
demand curve in the two-group case is the weighted sum of the demand curve for workers
of group a and the demand curve for workers of group b.
Equilibrium in the labor market is now defined by the following condition:
pnda(θ, wa) + (1− p)ndb(θ, wb) = pnsa(θ, Ba) + (1− p)nsb(θ, Bb) (14)
Equilibrium condition (14) defines θ as an endogenous variable, affected by the level of
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benefits Ba and Bb of both groups of unemployed individuals in equilibrium. Let us start
from a situation where Ba = Bb = B and workers of both groups are identical so that
ea = eb, and investigate the effect of a small change dBa > 0 on hazard rates of workers of
group a and group b. Because of the equilibrium adjustment of θ in response to a change
in UI benefits Ba, the effect of UI on the job finding probability of workers of group a,
ea · f(θ) can again be decomposed into two parts, a micro-effect capturing the change in
search effort of workers of group a keeping labor market tightness constant and a “market
externality”, capturing the effect of the change in labor market tightness:
dha
dBa
=
d(ea · f(θ))
dBa
=
∂ea
∂Ba
· f(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Micro effect
+
Market externality︷ ︸︸ ︷
ea · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθBa (15)
But workers of group b also experience a change in their job finding probability, even
if their unemployment benefits are unaffected, due to the equilibrium adjustment of θ in
response to a change in UI benefits Ba:
dhb
dBa
=
d(eb · f(θ))
dBa
= eb · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθBa (16)
Equation (16) shows that the effect of a change in benefits Ba for a treated group of
workers on the job finding probability of non-treated workers of group b identifies the
market externality. This result motivates our empirical strategy. By looking at how the
job finding probability of non-treated workers varies in response to a change in unemploy-
ment benefits of similar workers in the same labor market, one can identify equilibrium
adjustments in labor market tightness.
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Figure 5: Market externalities of UI extensions in an equilibrium search-
and-matching model with two groups of workers:
A. Rigid wages & diminishing returns
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Notes: Both panels describe the effect on labor market equilibrium of a change in benefits for one group of workers (group
a), when firms cannot discriminate vacancies between the two groups of workers. In both panel, we start from equilibrium
E1, where all workers get the same UI benefits. A group of workers then receives a higher level of benefits, which shifts their
labor supply to the left. The new aggregate labor supply is a weighted average of labor supply of both groups, depicted
by the dashed red line. In case of rigid wages (panel A) as in the model of Michaillat [2012], labor demand is not affected,
and, if returns to labor are decreasing, the new equilibrium E2 is characterized by higher labor market tightness θ∗2 and
positive market externalities on workers of group b. When wages adjust to the change in benefits (panel B), firms reduce
their vacancy openings, and if returns to labor are almost constant, it can lead to a decline in θ and negative externalities
on workers of group b.
We now explain how market externalities in the two group experiment relate to market
externalities in the one group experiment where all workers of the labor market are treated.
Equilibrium adjustments in tightness in the two group experiment is given by implicitly
differentiating equilibrium condition (14):
dθ
dBa
= p
∂nda
∂wa
∂wa
∂Ba
− ∂nsa
∂Ba
∂ns
∂θ
− ∂nd
∂θ
(17)
When we start from na = nb, we can rewrite equation (17) in terms of elasticities:
εθBa = p ·
ε
nda
w · εwaBa − εn
s
a
Ba
εn
s
θ − εndθ
= p · εθB (18)
A few points are worth noting about equation (18). First, equilibrium adjustments in
labor market tightness in the two group experiment increase with the size of the treated
group. The larger p, the larger the market externalities. Second, as p tends to 1, εθBa
tends to εθB, so that market externalities identified on group b will tend to capturing the
effect of treating the entire labor market. Third, market externalities identified through
the change in the job finding probability of workers of group b still capture the wage
effect even if wages are bargained at the individual level. The intuition is that within a
labor market, there is random matching. The expected profit of opening vacancies is the
weighted average of the profits of opening vacancies for each group of workers. Therefore
the increase in bargained wages of workers of group a will reduce the expected profit of
opening vacancies and will then affect overall vacancy posting in the market. Finally, the
above have assumed that the two types of workers were perfectly equivalent and initially
earn the same wage. In that case, the firm’s profit-maximizing employment level does not
depend on the mix of workers. If there is imperfect substitution and/or the two types
of workers get initially different wages, employment depends on the mix of workers of
both types in equilibrium. An extra term kicks in in formula 17. Graphically, the labor
demand curve shifts as result of an increase in Ba.
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In figure 5, we offer a graphical representation of market externalities of UI extensions
in the two group model, and we illustrate how different assumptions about the production
23Note that the direction of the labor-demand shift is a priori unclear. An increase in Ba may change
the employment mix such that opening up new vacancies may in fact be profitable for the firm (shifting
labor demand to the right). To see this, consider the simple case when workers are perfect substitutes
but initially group a gets a higher wage than group b. When an increase in Ba strongly decreases labor
supply of group a but does not affect wages of group a, the expected wages costs of a randomly matched
worker will decrease, thus firms will increase employment. However, these effects are second order as
labor demand is affected only indirectly through the impact of Ba on n
s
a.
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function and the wage setting process affect the sign and magnitude of externalities. Both
panels describe the effect on labor market equilibrium of a change in benefits for one group
of workers (group a), when firms cannot discriminate vacancies between the two groups
of workers. In both panel, we start from equilibrium E1, where all workers get the same
UI benefits. Workers of group a then receive a higher level of benefits, which shifts their
labor supply to the left. The new aggregate labor supply is a weighted average of labor
supply of both groups, depicted by the dashed red line. In case of rigid wages (panel A) as
in the model of Michaillat [2012], labor demand is not affected, and, if returns to labor are
decreasing, the new equilibrium E2 is characterized by higher labor market tightness θ
∗
2
and positive market externalities on workers of group b. When wages adjust to the change
in benefits (panel B), firms reduce their vacancy openings, and if returns to labor are al-
most constant, it can lead to a decline in θ and negative externalities on workers of group b.
Implications for the wedge between micro and macro effects of UI
We are interested in recovering from the two group experiment, the wedge between
micro and macro effects of treating the whole labor market. More specifically, starting
from equation (9), we are interested in the wedge W = 1 − eM/em where eM = dh
dB
is
the total effect on job finding rate of treating the whole market by an increase dB in UI
benefits (“macro effect”) and em is the “micro effect” from equation (9) (i.e. the effect of
an increase dB in UI benefits on individual job finding rate).
From equation (9) we know that W = e
X
em
, where eX = e · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθB is the market
externality of treating the whole labor market. From equations (16) and (18), we know
that in the two group experiments, starting from a situation where both groups have the
same benefits and search effort
dhb
dBa
= p · eX (19)
In other words, the effect of changing benefits for workers of group a on the job finding
rates of workers of group b identifies p times the externality of treating all workers, where
p is the fraction of workers of group a in the labor market.
In the two group experiment, again starting from a situation where both groups have
the same benefits and search effort, we also know that the micro effect em will be the
same than when treating the whole market. This means that the micro effect ∂e
∂B
· f(θ)
from equation (9) is equal to the micro effect from equation (15): ∂ea
∂Ba
· f(θ). And from
equations (15) and (16), we know that the micro effect will be identified in the two group
experiment as
em =
dha
dBa
− dhb
dBa
(20)
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In other words, the micro effect is identified by the effect of the change in UI benefits
on the job finding rate of workers of group a minus the effect on the job finding rate of
workers of group b. It follows from equations (19) and (20) that we can identify the wedge
W of treating the whole market in the two group experiment:
W =
1
p
·
dhb
dBa
dha
dBa
− dhb
dBa
(21)
Using the fact that we start from a situation where Ba = Bb and ha = hb, and under
the approximation that hazard rates are somewhat constant over a spell so that the
duration of unemployment D ≈ 1/h we can rewrite equation 21 in terms of responses of
unemployment duration:
W =
1
p
·
dDb
dBa
dDa
dBa
− dDb
dBa
(22)
A.3 Market externalities across labor markets
In most quasi-experiments involving variations in the generosity of unemployment ben-
efits, treatment is restricted to some but not all labor markets. The REBP program is
no exception. The program extended the duration of UI benefits for individuals above
age 50 in specific regions meeting specific criteria. A firms can adjust to the policy not
only by changing the number of vacancy it opens in the treated labor market, but also by
changing the number of vacancies it opens in other labor markets where there exists close
substitutes to the treated population. In other words, there exist “non-treated” labor
markets that, due to their (geographic or technological) proximity to the treated labor
market, will also be affected by the policy in equilibrium. We show here how the existence
of other labor markets will affect market externalities. First, we show how (and discuss
why) equilibrium labor market conditions in other markets will be affected. Then, we
discuss how the existence of other markets affect the magnitude of market externalities
in the treated market.
How are other labor markets affected by a change in UI policy in one labor market?
We focus again on a two group model, but now group a and group b are assumed to be in
two different labor markets. This means that firms can perfectly discriminate between the
two groups of workers when they open vacancies. In practice, there will be vacancies va to
which only workers of group a will apply and vacancies vb to which only workers of group
b will apply. The ability of firms to direct their search by tailoring the characteristics of
vacancies to each group of workers means that there will be in effect two labor markets
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with two labor market tightness in equilibrium.
Firms’ profits are now equal to:
pi = φ
(
p ·na, (1−p) ·nb
)
−p ·na ·wa− (1−p) ·nb ·wb− r ·ψ ·
{
p · na
q(θa)
+
(1− p) · nb
q(θb)
}
(23)
For the firm, the optimal choice of vacancies to open for group a and group b is equivalent
to the optimal choice of na and nb, as va vacancies translate into na/q(θa) jobs for workers
of group a (and vb vacancies translate into nb/q(θb) jobs for workers of group b). The
optimal labor demand of firms for workers of group a, nda, and for workers of group b, n
d
b ,
is then implictely defined by the two following first-order conditions:
∂φ
∂na
=
{
wa +
rψ
q(θa)
}
(24)
∂φ
∂nb
=
{
wb +
rψ
q(θb)
}
(25)
When technology is such that the marginal product of labor for group a (resp. group b)
depends on the level of employment of workers of group b (resp. group a), nda (resp. n
d
b)
will be a function of nb (resp. of na). Equilibrium conditions in the two labor markets
can therefore be written as: nda(wa, θa, nb) = n
s
a(θa, Ba) and n
d
b(wb, θb, na) = n
s
b(θb, Bb). In
particular, if na and nb are substitutes and there are diminishing returns to both na and
nb, then
∂2φ
∂nb∂na
will be negative. This means that, when the employment of workers of
group a decreases (say, as a result of the REBP), the marginal product of workers of group
b, ∂φ
∂nb
, will increase. Firms will respond by posting more vacancies vb. This will in turn
increase labor market tightness θb, bringing up the cost of opening vacancies in the market
for group b workers, and decrease the productivity of group b workers, until condition (25)
is met again. A decrease in the employment of workers of group a is therefore met by
an increase in the employment of workers of group b, when workers are substitutes. The
larger the elasticity of substitution σ between group a and group b workers, the larger
this substitution effect.
A change in UI benefits Ba for workers of group a in one given market can therefore
create market externalities on workers of group b, who are in a separate labor market.
These market externalities are given by:
dhb
dBa
=
d(ebf(θb))
dBa
= ebf
′(θb)
dθb
dBa
(26)
where the equilibrium adjustment in tightness dθb
dBa
determines the size of market exter-
nality. To calculate dθb
dBa
, we implicitly differentiate the system of equilibrium conditions
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for the two market “prices”, θa and θb, with respect to Ba, using the fact that n
d
a and n
d
b
are implicitly given by equations (24) and (25). Note that supply of and demand for type
b workers does not directly depend on Ba but only indirectly through changes in θa and
θb. In contrast, type a workers are also directly affected by changes in Ba: labor demand
is affected through the wage effect and labor supply through the effect on search effort.
Implicitly differentiating this system yields:
∂θb
∂Ba
=
pφba
[
−∂nsa
∂θa
∂wa
∂Ba
− ∂nsa
∂Ba
q′(θa)
q2(θa)
rψ
]
∆
(27)
where ∆ =
[
φaap
∂nsa
∂θa
+ q
′(θa)
q2(θa)
rψ
] [
φbb(1− p)∂n
s
b
∂θb
+ q
′(θb)
q2(θb)
rψ
]
−φ2ab(1−p)p∂n
s
b
∂θb
p∂n
s
a
∂θa
> 0, since
φaaφbb − φ2ab > 0.
A few points are important to note about equations (26) and (27). First, the existence
of market externalities across labor markets is entirely driven by the substitution effect.
This can be easily seen from the right-hand-side of equation (27), which is proportional
to the cross-derivative of the production function. When φab = 0, the marginal product
of type b is independent of type a employment, an increase in Ba leaves labor market
tightness for market b unchanged, and group b is entirely unaffected by the increase in
Ba.
24 In contrast, when φab < 0, so that the two types of workers are substitutes, a larger
Ba increases θb. There are two reasons. First, a higher Ba may trigger an increase in wa,
so that type a workers will be more expensive. Second, a higher Ba lowers search effort of
type a workers and vacancies become relatively easier to fill with type b workers than type
a workers. Firms will shift their labor demand towards type b and equilibrium tightness
in the market for workers of group b will go up. The higher the elasticity of substitution,
the larger (in absolute value) is φab and therefore the larger the market externality on the
non-treated labor market.
In terms of empirical identification, the existence of market externalities across la-
bor markets through substitution effects means that one needs to be very cautious when
choosing the control labor markets for the analysis. The control labor markets must be
chosen so as to provide a good counterfactual for what would have happened in the treated
labor market in the absence of REBP. At the same time, they must not offer substitution
opportunities from the treated labor market.
The second point worth noting is that market externalities on workers of group b, who
are now in a separate labor market, are different from market externalities in the treated
24Note again that, with a linear technology, we have φab = 0, and we should see no spillover effects
across labor markets in that case.
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labor market (workers of group a), contrary to the case where matching was random and
the two groups of workers were in the same labor market. This means that in practice,
the effect of REBP on the job finding probability of non-treated workers who are not in
the same labor market cannot directly identify the market externalities of interest in the
treated labor market.
Equation (27) shows that when there are multiple markets, one of them being treated
and others not being treated, there will be market externalities in non-treated markets
but these externalities cannot directly identify market externalities in the treated market.
What can we say then about market externalities in the treated market in this case?
How does the existence of substitution opportunities across labor markets affect market
externalities in the treated market?
Recall from equation (9) that market externalities within the treated market depend
on the impact of the increase in Ba on tightness in the treated market. This can be
inferred from implicit differentiation θa with respect to Ba using the two above equilibrium
equations. This yields:
∂θa
∂B
= p
−
[
φaa
∂nsa
∂B
− ∂wa
∂B
] [
φbb(1− p)∂n
s
b
∂θb
+ q
′(θb)
q2(θb)
rψ
]
+ (1− p)φ2ba ∂n
s
a
∂B
∂nsb
∂θb
∆
(28)
It is straightforward to verify that equation (28) reduces to (10) when we set p = 1.25
In the absence of any factors that could substitute for the treated workers, the results
from the one-group equilibrium apply. In contrast, when there are many substitution
possibilities and the share of the treated market in the aggregate economy is tiny (p goes
to zero), the externality on the treated market gets negligible.26 In other words, when the
treated market gets small relative to the aggregate economy, variations in labor market
tightness in the treated market in response to a change in UI benefits– and hence market
externalities of UI benefits– become negligible.
The existence of substitution opportunities across labor markets therefore bears im-
portant consequences for the interpretation of quasi-experimental results on externalities
using variations in unemployment benefits. When the experiment / policy variation is
such that the treated population of workers represent a relatively small labor market
and there exists non-treated labor markets that offer available substitutes for the treated
workers, market externalities in the treated labor market will be relatively small. And
25To see this, notice that the first order condition (φa(n
d
a, n
d
b)−wa(B)−rψ/q(θa) = 0 imply the partial
derivative ∂nda/∂wa = 1/φaa and ∂n
d
a/∂θa = −(q′(θa)/q2(θa)) · (rψ/φaa). Similarly, for group b.
26This assumes that type-a workers are not essential for production, φaa(0, n
d
b) > −∞. In that case,
as p goes to zero, the numerator of equation (28) goes to zero, while the denominator stays positive.)
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estimated equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness in such a context should
be interpreted as a clear lower bound on the equilibrium adjustments in labor market
tightness that would occur if the whole population of workers were to be treated.
A.4 Endogenous layoffs
The separation rate λ as been assumed exogenous. But in practice λ might be endoge-
nous to UI benefits (λ = λ(B)) and there is indeed evidence that the separation rate
increased for eligible workers during the REBP period (Winter-Ebmer [1996]), implying
that ∂λa/∂(Ba) > 0. How will the response of the separation rate to UI benefits af-
fect market externalities of UI? From the definition of labor supply given in equation 6,
ns = ef(θ)
λ+ef(θ)
, which follows from the equality of flows in and out of unemployment in
the steady-state, it appears clearly that an increase in the separation rate λ will shift
labor supply downwards everything else equal. For a given search effort level, and for a
given labor market tightness, an increase in the separation rate means that the stock of
unemployed will be larger in the steady state and therefore the probability of finding a
job (ns) will be lower. An increase in the separation rate is equivalent to a downward
shift in labor supply and its effect on labor supply is comparable to that of a decrease in
search effort. If both search effort and the separation rate are responsive to UI benefits,
the effect of a change in benefit of workers of group a on labor supply of group a is the
sum of a search effort effect (e′a · λa) and of a separation rate effect (ea · λ′a):
∂nsa
∂Ba
=
[e′a · λa − ea · λ′a]f(θ)
(λa + eaf(θ))2
In the context of REBP, because the separation rate effect ea · λ′a > 0 is significantly
positive, the downward shift in labor supply of treated workers will be even stronger than
if only search effort had reacted to the policy.
But an increase in the separation rate λ also increases recruiting costs of firms. As
new jobs have a higher probability of being terminated, the net present value of a job
decreases. This will create a downward shift of nd that can easily be seen in equation
(7) which implicitly determines labor demand of firms nd as a decreasing function of the
layoff rate: ∂nd/∂λ ≤ 0. So the overall effect on labor market tightness of a change in
benefits for workers of group a when layoffs are endogenous is:
dθ
dBa
= p
∂nda
∂wa
∂wa
∂Ba
+ ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
− ∂nsa
∂Ba
∂ns
∂θ
− ∂nd
∂θ
(29)
where ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
is the layoff rate effect on labor demand. The overall effect of endogenous
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layoffs on equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness dθ
dBa
is therefore ambiguous,
as can be seen by comparing equation (29) to equation (17). The presence of endogenous
layoffs creates a negative layoff rate effect on labor demand ( ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
≤ 0), which will
tend to reduce labor market tightness, but it also increases the magnitude of the shift in
labor supply ∂n
s
a
∂Ba
as discussed earlier, which will tend to increase labor market tightness.
The relative magnitude of these two effects will therefore determine if endogenous layoffs
deepens or attenuates the effect of UI on equilibrium labor market tightness.
B Defining labor markets using vacancy data
Identifying which workers are competing for the same vacancies workers satisfying the
REBP-eligibility requirements is critical to determine and define the relevant labor mar-
kets that are affected by externalities of the REBP program. As explained in section A.2,
when treated and non-treated workers are in the same labor market, i.e. competing for
the same vacancies, the effect of the program on non-treated workers can identify equilib-
rium labor market tightness in the labor market. When treated and non-treated workers
are competing for different vacancies, there are in practice two search markets for labor,
and the effect of the program on non-treated workers cannot directly identify equilibrium
adjustments in the treated market.
To determine which workers are competing for the same vacancies as REBP eligible
workers, we use detailed micro data on the universe of job vacancies posted in public
employment agencies available for the period 1994-1998. (Vacancies posted in public em-
ployment agencies represent 30% to 40% of all posted vacancies). This data set has two
important features. First, the data records for each vacancy all the detailed information
about the characteristics of the vacancy. This includes the firm identifier of the firm post-
ing the vacancy, the date (in month) at which the vacancy is opened and the date at which
it is closed, the reason for closing the vacancy (the vacancy has been filled, search has
been abandoned, etc.), the identifier of the public employment service where the vacancy
is posted, the industry and job classifications of the job, details on the duration and type
of the contract (full-time,/part-time tenured/non-tenured, seasonal job, etc.), the age re-
quirement if any, the education requirement if any, the gender requirement if any, and the
posted wage or range of wage if any. Second, the data contains the personal identifier of
the person who filled the vacancy if the vacancy is filled. This personal identifier enables
us to match this vacancy data to the ASSD and determine the characteristics and REBP
eligibility status of the person filling the vacancy.
Our strategy consists in using all the information that we have on each vacancy, and
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estimate how well the characteristics of each vacancy predicts the REBP eligibility status
of the worker who fills the vacancy. If there is perfect discrimination in vacancies between
eligible and non-eligible workers, then eligible and non-eligible workers will be competing
for two different sets of vacancies and will effectively be in two different labor markets
from a search-theoretic perspective. Empirically, this means that characteristics of va-
cancies for eligible and non-eligible workers are different, and therefore characteristics of
vacancies should predict very well whether the individual filling the vacancy is eligible to
REBP or not. To the contrary, if eligible and non-eligible workers are in the same job-
search market, they will compete for the same vacancies. When opening a vacancy in this
market, and conditional on search effort of eligible and non-eligible workers, a firm will be
randomly matched to an eligible or to a non-eligible worker. In other words, conditional
on search effort of eligible and non-eligible workers, matching is random across eligible
and non-eligible workers and vacancies in this market will be filled (randomly) by eligible
or non-eligible workers. In this case, the characteristics of a vacancy will have very little
predictive power on the eligibility status of the worker who fills it.
To implement this strategy, we take all vacancies opened by firms located in REBP
regions that ended up being filled (by REBP eligible or non-eligible male workers) during
1994 to 1998. (Before this period, the quality of the data is too weak and thus cannot be
used for our analysis.) We estimate the following latent variable model:
Y ∗i = X
′
iβ + i
Yi =
{
0 if Y ∗i < 0
1 if Y ∗i ≥ 0
where Yi is a dummy variable indicating whether the worker filling vacancy i is eligible
to REBP or not, and Xi is a vector of all the characteristics of vacancy i. These char-
acteristics are the two-digit industry code of the firm opening the vacancy, the two-digit
occupation code of the job, the duration of the contract (temporary contract, unlimited
contract, seasonal job, holiday work, etc.), whether the job is full-time, part-time or flex-
ible hours, whether the job hours are negotiable or not, whether the job implies shift
work, whether it implies night or extra hours work, whether the job is an apprenticeship,
the size of the firm (in 5 categories), the age required for the job if any, and the level of
education required for the job (in 17 categories) if any. We estimate this model using a
logit. We run the model separately for various categories of non-eligible workers (35 to 40
years old workers, 40 to 45 years old workers, 45 to 50 years old workers, and 50-54 years
old non-eligible workers) in order to compare each of these categories of workers to REBP
eligible workers. For each of the categories of non-eligible workers, we then analyze the
predictive power of the model using various goodness-of-fit measures.
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In figure 1 panel A, we start by plotting the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit
tests for the logit model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness of fit test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow
χ2 goodness of fit test, for different categories of non-eligible workers. A low p-value for
the test indicates a poor fit of the data. Both tests suggest that the model fits the data
very well for comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 35 to 40, but tend
to perform more and more poorly as we use non-eligible workers that are older. When
comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54, the p-value is very close
to zero, and the goodness-of-fit of the model is extremely poor. This suggests that the
predictive power of vacancy characteristics on eligibility is very good when comparing
workers that are below 50 to eligible workers, but very low when comparing eligible and
non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54. In other words, workers age below 50 seem to fill
vacancies that have characteristics that are very different from the vacancies filled by
eligible workers. But eligible and non-eligible workers above 50 seem to fill vacancies that
have very similar characteristics. This suggests that workers aged below 50 are likely to
be in a different job search market than eligible workers, but non-eligible workers aged 50
to 54 are very likely to compete for the same vacancies as eligible workers.
In panel B of figure 1, we plot the fraction of observations that are incorrectly pre-
dicted by the model (i.e. the predicted eligibility status to REBP is different from the
true eligibility status of the worker filling the vacancy) for all categories of non-eligible
workers. The fraction of misclassified observations is less than 7.5% for the model com-
paring eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 30 to 40, but increases up to more
than 25% for the model comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to to
54. We also plot the fraction of type I errors, i.e. the fraction of true non-eligible workers
that are predicted as being eligible to REBP by the model. Type I errors are particularly
relevant in our context. They provide information about how likely it is that a non-eligible
worker is competing for a vacancy that has been “tailored” to eligible workers based on its
characteristics. In this sense, type I errors provide direct information about the intensity
of the competition that eligible workers receive from various groups of non-eligible work-
ers when a vacancy is opened in “their” search market. The figure indicates that type
I errors seem to be particularly severe when comparing eligible workers to non-eligible
workers aged 50 to 54. Because classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each
component group, and always favors classification into the larger group, the classification
error measures of panel B should still be interpreted with caution. We therefore tend to
prefer goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel A.
These results help inform our identification strategy and choose the proper groups of
non-eligible workers to identify the presence of externalities. The results indicate that it
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is much more likely for non-eligible workers aged 50 and over to compete for the same
vacancies as eligible workers than for non-eligible workers aged below 50. This means that
non-eligible workers aged 50 and above are likely to be in the same job-search market as
eligible workers, while non-eligible workers aged below 50 tend to compete for different
vacancies and are therefore in a different job-search market. This means that the effect
of REBP on job-finding probabilities of eligible workers aged 50 and above is more likely
to identify variations in labor market tightness in the job-search market of REBP-treated
workers. As explained in section A.2, these variations in labor market tightness in the
job-search market of REBP-treated workers capture both the rat race effect and the wage
effect of UI, and are the relevant variations to consider to identify the equilibrium effect
of variations in UI in a given labor market.
Non-eligible workers below 50 years old, to the contrary, seem to be competing for dif-
ferent vacancies than workers eligible to REBP. This means that they are more likely to
operate in a different search market than workers eligible to REBP. The effect of REBP on
their job finding probability is therefore more likely to identify externalities across search
markets. In section A.3, we have shown that such externalities stem from substitution
effects, and cannot directly identify the effect of REBP on the labor market tightness in
the search market of treated workers.
Overall, the vacancy data is useful to determine the scope of the different job search
markets. This analysis indicates that the externalities that we may find on non-eligible
workers may be very different in nature and in magnitude across different groups of
non-eligible workers. Non-eligible workers aged 50+ are more likely to experience larger
externalities stemming from equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness in the
search market of workers eligible to REBP. Non-eligible workers that are younger than
50 are more likely to experience externalities stemming from substitution effects across
search markets.
C Additional tables and figures
Standard errors To correct for the presence of common random effects, we cluster stan-
dard errors at the region-year level. We have checked sensitivity of inference in three ways.
First, we allow for clustering by markets defined as county-by-industry-by-education cells
(see appendix C, table 6). Results indicate that standard errors are robust to clustering
by markets. Second, clustering by market is fully flexible in terms of clustering in time but
assumes no correlation across markets or space. Conley [1999] proposes a more flexible
approach to inference that allows for arbitrary tempo-spatial dependence in shocks within
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Table 6: Sensitivity of Baseline Results to Inference Assumptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-employment Spell Spell
duration duration > 100 wks > 26 wks
β0 43.37 29.17 0.240*** 0.237***
Baseline cluster (5.069)*** (5.444)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0240)***
Market cluster (4.581)*** (4.867)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0278)***
Spatial HAC (4.319)*** (4.785)*** (0.0230)*** (0.0250)***
Permutation (1.143)*** (0.930)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0099)***
γ0 -3.740 -2.327 -0.0130 -0.0165
Baseline cluster (0.758)*** (0.629)*** (0.00311)*** (0.00660)**
Market cluster (0.798)*** (1.004)** (0.00231)*** (0.00585)***
Spatial HAC (0.862)*** (1.012)** (0.00287)*** (0.00889)*
Permutation (1.528)** (1.124)** (0.00519)** (0.00880)*
N 262344 232135 262344 262344
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010. This table reports the main result from Table 2. Numbers
in parentheses display standard errors. Baseline standard errors allow for clustering at the region * year
level. Market cluster standard errors allow for clustering at the level of the market, i.e. a county ×
education × industry cell – this is the classification we use to detect market externalities in Table 5 of the
paper. Spatial HAC standard errors allow for any correlation in errors in a circle of 33 kilometers around
a job seeker’s location, and zero correlation beyond that. Spatial HAC standard errors also allow for
full correlation between spells starting in the same quarter, one half correlation between spells that start
one quarter apart, and no correlation beyond. Permutation standard errors are based on 235 placebo
estimates of simulations of the REBP program during non-REBP time periods.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.
a distance and an autocorrelation cutoff, so-called spatial HAC standard errors. We re-
port results that use a distance cutoff of 33 km – the median commuting distance for job
seekers in Austria – and an autocorrelation cutoff of two quarters. Spatial HAC standard
errors are similar to our baseline standard errors. Third, both clustering on market and
spatial HAC standard errors rely on assumptions regarding the tempo-spatial dependence
of standard errors. Permutation is a way to assess sensitivity to these assumptions. Per-
mutation works as follows: we first construct a set of 235 placebo REBP estimates on
non-REBP periods and then conduct inference using the distribution of placebo REBP
effects. Permutation based standard errors for the market externality are somewhat larger
than baseline standard errors, and substantially smaller for the effect of REBP on the
eligible. But our inference remains robust to adopting this permutation procedure.27
27Kline and Moretti [2014] have adopted the spatial HAC approach in their analysis of the Tennesess
Valley Authority. Chetty et al. [2014] use permutation to study sensitivity of inference in active savings
decisions in a regression discontinuity design. Lalive, Wuellrich and Zweimueller [2013] use permutation
to test sensitivity of disabled employment to financial incentives in a threshold design.
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis to sample restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment duration Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Men, 46 to 59, excluding steel sector
β0 50.20
∗∗∗ 44.84∗∗∗ 43.82∗∗∗ 33.60∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(3.607) (3.300) (3.210) (5.165) (0.0192) (0.0155)
γ0 -2.680
∗∗∗ -2.133∗∗∗ -3.222∗∗∗ -2.514∗∗∗ -0.00912∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗
(0.782) (0.657) (0.608) (0.527) (0.00240) (0.00545)
N 378556 369477 369477 304664 369477 369477
B. Men and women, 46 to 54, excluding steel sector
β0 55.93
∗∗∗ 52.28∗∗∗ 51.80∗∗∗ 40.59∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(3.549) (3.472) (3.319) (5.147) (0.0192) (0.0163)
γ0 -2.241
∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗ -3.217∗∗∗ -1.892∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗
(0.781) (0.648) (0.682) (0.608) (0.00297) (0.00522)
N 359901 351433 351433 296768 351433 351433
C. Men, 46 to 54, including steel sector
β0 47.33
∗∗∗ 43.82∗∗∗ 43.85∗∗∗ 30.58∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(5.534) (5.108) (5.045) (5.603) (0.0290) (0.0237)
γ0 -2.248
∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗ -3.581∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗
(0.825) (0.730) (0.785) (0.632) (0.00304) (0.00700)
N 284099 278021 278021 245621 278021 278021
Educ., industry,
citizenship, × × × × ×
marital status
Region-specific × × × ×
trends
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. The table presents estimates of the model presented in equation (3) where
we explore the sensitivity of our baseline results to various sample restrictions. β0 identifies the effect of REBP on eligible
unemployed, while γ0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-eligible unemployed in REBP counties. In column (1), we estimate
this model without any other controls. In column (2) we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry
codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we add controls for preexisting trends by
region. Column (5) uses as an outcome the duration of total non-employment (conditional on finding employment at the
end of the unemployment spell). Columns (6) and (7) use as an outcome the probability of experiencing unemployment
spells longer than 100 weeks and 26 weeks respectively. In panel A, the estimation sample includes all men age 46 to 59. In
panel B, the sample includes all men and women age 46 to 54. In panel C, the sample is the same as our baseline sample
but also includes workers who ever worked in the steel sector.
Table 8: Robustness to REBP-counties-specific shocks: Externalities on non-
eligible aged 50 to 54 using unemployed aged 30 to 39 in REBP counties as a control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell
duration duration >26 wks
β0 54.32*** 50.81*** 30.30*** 30.29*** 0.312*** 0.275***
(7.480) (6.784) (7.639) (7.192) (0.0432) (0.0362)
γ0 (externality) -7.878** -6.466* -7.643*** -6.347** -0.0742*** -0.0554**
(3.880) (3.437) (2.156) (2.461) (0.0222) (0.0213)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × ×
N 182689 180098 170388 168163 182689 180098
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×county level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. We use the same strategy as in table 2 but we use men
aged 30 to 39 in REBP counties as a control instead of men 50 to 54 in non-REBP counties. We run
on a sample restricted to unemployed aged 30 to 39 and 50 to 54 a diff-in-diff specification equivalent to
equation (3) where we replace M by A = 1[Age > 50]. This specification enables us to fully control for
shocks to the labor markets of REBP counties contemporaneous to REBP.
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Table 9: Externalities on non-eligible unemployed by initial level of labor
market tightness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
REBP effect on non-treated duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
All non-eligible
γHigh θ0 ( θ ≥ P50) 0.728 -1.650 0.00877 -0.0208
(1.411) (1.088) (0.00571) (0.0125)
γLow θ0 (θ < P50 ) -2.250*** -1.809** -0.00457* -0.00936
(0.726) (0.733) (0.00255) (0.00657)
F-Test γLow θ0 = γ
High θ
0 [0.0635] [0.910] [0.0530] [0.422]
N 262109 231940 262109 262109
Non-eligible 50+
γHigh θ0 ( θ ≥ P50) -1.317 -2.788 0.00878 -0.0309
(4.073) (2.745) (0.0181) (0.0204)
γLow θ0 (θ < P50 ) -7.539*** -5.999** -0.0167** -0.0312*
(2.334) (2.407) (0.00801) (0.0180)
F-Test γLow θ0 = γ
High θ
0 [0.0530] [0.320] [0.114] [0.992]
N 122174 102598 122174 122174
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers working in non-steel related sectors. All duration outcomes are expressed
in weeks. The table presents estimates of the effects of REBP on non-eligible workers broken down by the
initial level of labor market tightness in county×industry×education cells. Initial labor market tightness is
obtained by dividing the average monthly number of vacancies posted in 1990 (the first year for which we
have some vacancy information by county) in each county×industry×education cell, by the average monthly
number of unemployed in the same county×industry×education cell. γHigh θ0 identifies externalities of REBP
on non-treated workers in REBP county×industry×education cells where labor market tightness was above
the median level of tightness in 1990. γLow θ0 identifies externalities of REBP on non-treated workers in REBP
county×industry×education cells where labor market tightness was below the median level of tightness in
1990.
D Wages
D.1 Effect of REBP on reemployment wages
As highlighted in section I and explained formally in appendix section A, one of the key
requirement for externalities to be positive on non-eligible workers is that wages do not
react much to outside options of workers. Here, we investigate explicitly this question by
looking at the effect of REBP on reemployment wages and other characteristics of jobs
at reemployment.28
The identification of the effect of REBP on wages is very different from our previous
market externality analysis, as we now wish to compare eligible workers to non-eligible
workers (rather than non-eligible in treated and non treated markets). The identification
of the effect of REBP on wages is difficult for at least three reasons. First, REBP treat-
ment is correlated with longer unemployment duration, which may directly affect wages
through duration dependence effects. If reemployment wages depend on the duration of
the unemployment spell w = w(D,B) (because of human capital depreciation, or discrim-
ination from the employers), then the effect of a change in benefits B on reemployment
wage can be decomposed into two effects:
dw
dB
=
∂w
∂D
· ∂D
∂B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Duration effect
+
Reservation wage effect︷︸︸︷
∂w
∂B
If reemployment wages decline over the duration of a spell ( ∂w
∂D
< 0), the total effect of an
increase in benefits on reemployment wages might be zero or even negative even though
the reservation wage effect is positive.
The second issue is that REBP treatment affects the probability of entering into unem-
ployment and REBP recipients may therefore be selected along unobserved characteristics
that are correlated with wages. Treatment is also correlated with the probability of ever
reentering the labor force, which creates additional selection issues when looking at reem-
ployment wages.
The third issue is that REBP affects labor market tightness, which will in turn affect
the bargaining power of workers. It is thus difficult to separate what is the pure reservation
wage effect from other equilibrium effects affecting wages.
We try to address these issues in the following analysis, but we want to stress that
our analysis remains tentative. To deal with the first issue, we follow the methodology
of Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012a] and estimate the effect of variations in
benefits on reemployment wages conditional on unemployment duration. We do this first
28Note that Lalive [2007] discusses the effects of benefit extension programs on re-employment wages
without conditioning on elapsed unemployment duration.
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in the diff-in-diff setting of equation 3, and then in a RD setting taking advantage of
the age eligibility discontinuity at 50 and experience eligibility discontinuity at 15 years.
Note that in both cases, the identifying assumption requires that there is no correlation
between unobserved heterogeneity and unemployment benefits conditional on unemploy-
ment duration which is a much stronger assumption than in the standard diff-in-diff or RD
assumptions where we only need that the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
and unemployment benefits is zero.
We plot in appendix figure 6 post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of
the unemployment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties for eligible workers (aged 50 to
54 with more than 15 years of experience). The difference between REBP and non-REBP
counties at each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared to the
same difference in panel A (when REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate of
the effect of REBP on reemployment wages conditional on spell duration. This evidence
suggests that there was no effect of REBP on reemployment wages.
We formally assess this result in appendix table 10 by running a simple diff-in-diff
model where we compare workers eligible to REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers
(control). Each panel uses a different control group. In panel A, we use workers aged
50 to 54 with more than 15 years of experience but residing in non-REBP regions. In
panel B we use workers aged 50 to 54 residing in REBP regions but with less than 15
years of experience. In panel C we use workers aged 46 to 49 with more than 15 years of
experience and residing in REBP regions. In column (1), we estimate the model without
further controls. In column (2) we add a vector of controls including education, 15 industry
codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. These specifications tend to
deliver a negative effect of REBP on reemployment wages. This negative effect may well
be driven by selection into unemployment. We know from table 3 that REBP has affected
the inflow rate into unemployment of eligible workers. This means that the selection of
eligible workers may be different during REBP. We try to control for this using pre-
employment wages. In column (3) we add a rich set of pre-unemployment wage dummies
to control for potential differential self-selection into unemployment due to REBP. As
explained above, the negative effect on reemployment wages found in column (1) and (2)
can also be due to duration dependence effects. In column (4) we allow for an effect of
longer unemployment spells during on reemployment wages (because of skill depreciation,
employer discrimination, etc.). Following the methodology of Schmieder, von Wachter
and Bender [2012a], we condition on the duration of unemployment using a rich set of
dummies for the duration of unemployment prior to finding a new job. In this preferred
specification of column (4), irrespective of the control group we are using, we always find
no significant effect of REBP on reemployment wages.
To complement our diff-in-diff approach, we also focus on the age eligibility disconti-
nuity at 50 in REBP counties and estimate RD effects of the REBP extensions controlling
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for the effect of duration on reemployment wages by adding a rich set of dummies for the
duration of the spell prior to finding the job.
E[Y |A = a] =
p¯∑
p=0
[γp(a− k)p + νp(a− k)p · 1[A ≥ k]] +
T∑
t=0
1[D = t] (30)
where Y is real reemployment wage, A is age at the beginning of the unemployment spell,
k = 50 is the age eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell
prior to finding the new job. We use a third-order polynomial specification. Results
are displayed in appendix figure 7, where we have estimated this model for six periods
to look at the dynamics of the wage response. Before REBP, we can detect no sign of
discontinuity at age 50 in reemployment wages. But interestingly, we can detect a small
discontinuity at the beginning of REBP (1988-1990). This discontinuity increases over
time and is the largest in 1991-1993, at the peak of REBP. The implied RD estimate of
the elasticity of wages with respect to UI benefits is .14 (.04). This discontinuity then
decreases and disappears when REBP is over. This suggests that wages are relatively
rigid in the short run, but that in the longer run, wages might adjust to variations in
outside options of workers. Note, however, that the McCrary test rejects continuity of
the probability density function of the assignment variable (age) at the cutoff (50 years)
during REBP. This implies that the wage effects could also partly be driven by selection
(sorting) at the 50 years age cut-off.
We finally exploit the experience eligibility discontinuity in REBP counties using the
same methodology. Results are displayed in appendix figure 9. The figure displays for
REBP regions the relationship between experience in the past 25 years at the beginning
of unemployment spell and reemployment wages for workers aged 50 to 54. We use the
discontinuity created by the fact that workers with more than 15 years of experience are
eligible for REBP extensions while workers with less than 15 years are not eligible. The
graph shows the average reemployment wage for each bin of 6 months of past experience
for all non REBP years and for all REBP years. We also estimate a model of the form:
E[Y |E = e] = ∑p¯p=0 γp(a− k)p + νp(a− k)p · 1[E ≥ k] +∑Tt=0 1[D = t], where Y is real
reemployment wage, E is experience at the beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 15
is the experience eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell
prior to finding the new job. The graph plots the predicted values of this regression for all
non REBP years and for all REBP years using a 3rd order polynomial for the regressions.
Here, we find no evidence of an effect of REBP on reemployment wages. Note again
however that McCrary tests rejects continuity in the probability density function of the
assignment variable (experience) at the cutoff (15 years) during REBP.
Overall, this evidence, although tentative, suggests that wages of eligible workers did
not strongly respond to REBP, which is in line with the market externalities that we find.
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Yet, we cannot exclude that these results are confounded by selection, nor can we exclude
that wages would have adjusted in the very long run.
D.2 Implications of these results for the wage setting process
What can we learn on the wage setting process from this empirical evidence? Is this
evidence, combined with other available evidence, compatible with Nash bargaining?
Note that union membership is not extremely high in Austria, and the wage setting
process is less centralized and rigid than in most continental European countries. Austria
has (formally) a decentralized system of wage negotiations. 400 collective agreements
determine a minimum wage in the particular sector/occupation where the contract applies
and the wage growth for effective wages, leaving some room for individual bargaining.
In a standard DMP model with Nash bargaining, the wage w is a weighted average of
the productivity of the worker Π (which determines the reservation price of the employer)
and of the value of remaining unemployed z (which determines the reservation price of
the unemployed):
w = βΠ + (1− β)z
The weight β corresponds to the bargaining power of the unemployed. Therefore dw
dΠ
= β
and dw
dz
= 1−β. In other words, the bargaining power of the workers could be identified by
the variation of wages to a change in Π or z. The main problem is that we never observe p
nor z = z(B,X), which depends not only on unemployment benefits B but also on many
other different things such as the disutility of work, etc. The Nash bargaining model is
therefore fundamentally non-identifiable. Are there nevertheless credible values of Π, z
and β that would rationalize the empirical evidence presented here? First, all the evidence
in the macro literature (see, for instance, Shimer [2005] and Hagedorn and Manovskii
[2008]) suggests that wages do not react much to productivity shocks, so that dw
dΠ
is likely
to be small. This, implies that β is small. But if β is small, then wages should react a lot
to variations in the outside options of workers, i.e. the value of remaining unemployed:
dw
dz
and εz =
dw
dz
· z
w
should be large. Of course, we never directly observe εz. We only
observe the variation of wages to a change in unemployment benefits dw
dB
· B
w
= εz · ∂z∂B · Bz .
Given that we found dw
dB
· B
w
≈ 0, it is difficult to believe that εz is very large, unless
∂z
∂B
· B
z
<< 1. In other words, it is difficult to reconcile the small elasticity of w w.r.t z
and the small elasticity of w w.r.t p in the Nash bargaining model. The only solution is
to assume that B
z
<< 1 as in Hagedorn and Manovskii [2008]. But two pieces of evidence
argue against such an assumption. First, if we follow their preferred calibration for β,
our largest estimate of εz would imply
29 that B ≤ .05 · z which seems absurdly low. In
other words the value of remaining unemployed would be more than 20 times larger than
the value of the unemployment benefits received by an unemployed. Second, if B
z
<< 1,
29Assuming an additive specification z = B + f(X) so that ∂z∂B = 1.
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this in turn implies that accounting profits of firms Π − w are small, so that even small
increases in w have very large effects on vacancy openings by firms, driving labor market
tightness down. This means that the “wage externality” would be very large, shocking
labor demand down as in figure 5 panel B. This would also mean that the externalities
of large unemployment extension programs like REBP would likely go in the opposite
direction compared to our estimates. Overall, it seems reasonable to think that the Nash
bargaining model is maybe not the best way to describe the data. A model of wage setting
with some wage stickiness, at least in the short to medium run seems more appropriate.
Still, it does not mean that Nash bargaining is not appropriate to describe the longer
run. Indeed, the effects of REBP on wages seems to build up slightly over time and with
treatment intensity. In the very long run, wages may adjust more to B than what we
observe in the REBP experiment, suggesting that dw
dz
can be larger in the long run. This
has important implications for the design of UI policies.
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Figure 6: Reemployment wages conditional on duration of unemployment
spell in REBP and non-REBP counties
A. Before and after REBP
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Notes: the figure plots post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of the unemployment spell in REBP and
non-REBP counties for workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15 years of experience in the past 25 years prior to becoming
unemployed. Following the methodology of Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012a], by conditioning on the duration
of unemployment, we control for the fact that REBP eligible workers experienced longer unemployment spells during the
REBP period, which may impact reemployment wages if the distribution of wages depend on time spent unemployed
(because of skill depreciation or discrimination from employers for instance). The difference between REBP and non-REBP
counties at each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared to the same difference in panel A (when
REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate of the “reservation wage” effect. This evidence suggests that there
was no significant reservation wage effect of REBP.
Table 10: Diff-in-diff estimates of the effects of REBP on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log reemployment wage
A. Control: eligible workers 50-54 in non-REBP regions
REBP × eligible -0.0291** -0.0403** -0.0589*** -0.00895
(0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0123)
N 77743 76501 75594 76501
B. Control: non-eligible workers 50-54 in REBP regions
REBP × eligible -0.101 -0.0913 -0.0473 -0.0891
(0.0820) (0.0820) (0.0867) (0.0591)
N 23278 22996 22781 22996
C. Control: non-eligible workers 46-50 in REBP regions
REBP × eligible 0.00550 -0.0144 -0.0313 0.000967
(0.0228) (0.0286) (0.0240) (0.0242)
N 46701 46251 45826 46227
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × ×
Pre-unemployment
wage dummies ×
Set of dummies
for duration of U spell ×
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the year×region level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The
table investigates the impact of REBP on real reemployment wages. The specification is a diff-in-diff
where we compare workers eligible to REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers (control). Each panel
uses a different control group. In panel A, we use workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15 years of
experience but residing in non-REBP regions. In panel B we use workers aged 50 to 54 residing in REBP
regions but with less than 15 years of experience. In panel C we use workers aged 46 to 50 with 15
years of experience and residing in REBP regions. Column (1) runs a basic diff-in-diff specification using
log reemployment wages as an outcome with no additional controls. In column (2) we add a vector of
controls including education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. In
column (3) we add a rich set of pre-unemployment wage dummies to control for potential differential
self-selection into unemployment due to REBP. In column (4), following the methodology of Schmieder,
von Wachter and Bender [2012a], we condition on the duration of unemployment using a rich set of
dummies for the duration of unemployment prior to finding a new job. This is in order to control for
the fact that REBP eligible workers experienced longer unemployment spells during the REBP period,
which may impact reemployment wages if the distribution of wages depend on time spent unemployed
(because of skill depreciation or discrimination from employers for instance).
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Figure 7: RD evidence on wage bargaining over time: relationship between age and reemployment wages in REBP
counties
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Notes: the figure displays for REBP regions the relationship between age at the beginning of unemployment spell and reemployment wages for workers with more than 15 years of experience
in the past 25 years prior to becoming unemployed. Workers aged 50 or more are eligible for REBP extensions while workers aged less than 50 are not eligible. We follow the methodology of
Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012a] and estimate RD effects of the extensions controlling for duration by adding a rich set of dummies for the duration of the spell prior to finding
the job. E[Y |A = a] =∑p¯p=0 γp(a − k)p + νp(a − k)p · 1[A ≥ k] +∑Tt=0 1[D = t], where Y is real reemployment wage, A is age at the beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 50 is the
age eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell prior to finding the new job. The graph plots the predicted values of this regression for 6 periods: before REBP
1981-1987, at the beginning of REBP (1988-1990), at the peak of REBP (1991-1993), when REBP was scaled down (1994-1997) and then for two periods after the end of REBP (1998-2005
and 2006-2009). All regressions use a 3rd order polynomial specification. Note that for all periods, we ran a McCrary test, which ruled out the presence of a discontinuity in the probability
density function of the assignment variable (age) at the cutoff (50 years), except for the 1991-1993 where a discontinuity can be detected.
Figure 8: Probability density function of age at the start of an unemploy-
ment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties
A. Before REBP
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Figure 9: RD evidence on wages using experience cutoff: relationship be-
tween experience and reemployment wages in REBP counties
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Notes: the figure displays for REBP regions the relationship between experience in the past 25 years at
the beginning of unemployment spell and reemployment wages for workers aged 50 to 54. Workers with
more than 15 years of experience are eligible for REBP extensions while workers with less than 15 years
are not eligible. We follow the methodology of Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender [2012a] and estimate
RD effects of the extensions controlling for duration by adding a rich set of dummies for the duration of
the spell prior to finding the job. E[Y |E = e] = ∑p¯p=0 γp(a−k)p+νp(a−k)p ·1[E ≥ k] +∑Tt=0 1[D = t],
where Y is real reemployment wage, E is experience at the beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 15
is the experience eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell prior to finding
the new job. The graph plots the predicted values of this regression for all non REBP years and for all
REBP years using a 3rd order polynomial for the regressions.
